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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the impact of trading halts on the trading behaviour for a sample 
of halted stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). A detailed analysis of 
returns, liquidity and volatility around trading halts for a sample of 18,245 halted stocks 
captured over the period 1 January 2005 to 26 September, 2006 allows this study to extend 
the literature in three main ways.  First, this study re-examines the impact of ASX trading 
halts in a tighter regulatory environment, where companies were obliged to comply with 
stricter continuous disclosure requirements. Second, the availability of the largest database of 
trading halts in Australia, permits an investigation of the benefits of trading halts in a more 
rigorous manner. Finally, regression analysis is used to identify factors associated with 
aberrant stock volatility immediately after a trading halt. This will provide a better 
understanding of the trading behaviour surrounding trading halts and allow ASX exchange 
officials to fine-tune the market surveillance discipline. 
  
This study finds that trading halts result in abnormally high levels of trading volume and 
volatility in the period immediately following a trading halt. Additionally, wider bid-ask 
spreads and lower order depth immediately after a trading halt, suggest that information 
asymmetry is high during this period. Halted stock returns are persistently high for up to a 
full trading day after a trading halt. This suggests that trading halts do not fully allow for an 
efficient dissemination of new information. The impact of trading halts on stock volatility is 
found to be a function of firm size, and trading halt duration, but not for the announced 
reason for the trading halt. Overall, this study concludes that trading halts have an immediate 
negative impact on market quality.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The core objective of any securities regulator is to ensure that markets are fair, efficient and 
transparent.1 A universal approach to attain this objective depends crucially upon the 
regulations surrounding the markets. These regulations should be designed to provide a cost 
effective mechanism through which: (i) volatility (risk) in the markets can be minimised; and 
(ii) investors can readily liquidate their investments, thereby enabling them to trade in and out 
of such investments. The political passion for increasing regulation in securities markets 
tends to be heightened during times when the market is very volatile. This is especially true 
following stock market crashes and market sensitive news announcements. However, it 
should be emphasised that any policy change to increase regulatory intervention in securities 
markets should be carefully considered, as this can be detrimental to market efficiency. 
 
A trading halt is a tool that exchanges in all jurisdictions may use to ensure that their core 
objective is maintained, thereby protecting investors and preserving market integrity. 
Towards this end, trading halts provide appropriate time for investors to disseminate new 
information that could materially affect the value of a single security, a group of securities, or 
the market as a whole. In addition, trading halts can be used when there is an order 
imbalance, excessive volatility or when there is some other indication of disorderly trading. 
In all these cases, trading halts are principally designed to reduce volatility and promote 
orderly price discovery. Trading halts are classified in two categories: discretionary and 
automatic. A discretionary trading halt is approved based on the subjective decision of an 
exchange official or regulatory authority. Conversely, an automatic trading halt is 
                                                 
1
  It is noted that most securities regulators around the world are members of the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions IOSCO). One of the primary resolutions of IOSCO is to ensure its members 
cooperate together to promote high standards of regulation in order to maintain just, efficient and sound 
markets. (see http://www.iosco.org/about/) 
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immediately activated when actual trading behaviour on the market exceeds pre-set trading 
parameters, which are specified in the market rules of an exchange2.  
 
The objective of this study is to determine the impact of trading halts on equities markets. To 
achieve this end, the impact of discretionary trading halts on the trading behaviour of stocks 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange ASX) is analysed. Specifically, this study analyses 
for abnormal changes in returns, liquidity and volatility of ASX stocks around trading halts. 
A key motivation of this study is to contribute to the considerable debate among securities 
market regulators, market participants and academics as to the effectiveness of trading halts.  
Proponents of trading halts contend that trading halts maintain price stability, facilitate an 
orderly market and keep transaction costs low [see IOSCO (2002)]. This is consistent with 
empirical results found in the United States [see Madura, Tucker and Ritchie (2006)], Canada 
[see Kryzanowski (1979)], United Kingdom [see Engelen and Kabir (2006)], Sweden [see De 
Ridder (1990)] and Turkey [see Bildik (2004)].  
 
Conversely, opponents contend that a trading halt is not desirable because it delays stock 
price adjustments and impedes price discovery [see Christie, Corwin and Harris (2002)], 
imposes additional trading opportunity costs on investors and increases post-halt trading 
volatility [see Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) and Corwin and Lipson(2000)]. Furthermore, it 
can be argued that institutional investors can evaluate new information quicker than 
uninformed investors during the halt period, and can capitalise on that information after the 
halt using superior trade execution3. Perhaps the criticisms of trading halts are best described 
by Grossman (1990, p.3) who states: “I have always been suspicious of closing markets as 
doing so merely prevents consenting adults from carrying out their desires on the floor of the 
                                                 
2  For a more detailed analysis of the different types of trading halts see Section 2.1  
3
  Bildik (2004) finds that institutional investors take the price advantage of new information during a trading 
halt ahead of individual investors. 
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exchange.” Considering the controversial nature of this debate, it is imperative for a stock 
exchange to weigh the implied costs and benefits of trading halts against those of continuous 
trading.  
 
The second motivation of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of 
trading halts on Australian equity markets. The majority of extant literature on the impact of 
trading halts is largely concentrated in the United States. While there has been a measure of 
inconsistency in these studies, it is broadly accepted that post-halt trading behaviour is 
immediately associated with higher abnormal trading activity and higher volatility. A danger 
of universally applying these results to other non-U.S. stock markets is that they are specific 
to the institutional features of that stock market being investigated. Any difference in 
institutional features between markets may lead to varying results across stock exchanges as 
to the number of trading halts granted and their impact on various market quality variables 
(i.e., returns, liquidity, and volatility).  
 
The ASX provides many contrasts to U.S. equities markets, in respect to its market size, 
trading rules and regulatory environment. Firstly, the ASX has a considerably smaller market 
capitalisation and is dominated by resource stocks relative to U.S. equities markets, such as 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).4 Secondly, the trading halt mechanism used on the 
ASX to re-open trading differs to that on the NYSE, primarily because of market structure 
differences (see Section 2.2 for more details). These differences suggest that the impact of 
trading halts on market quality may be different in Australia.  
                                                 
4
  The materials sector comprises of 21% of the ASX market capitalisation (www.investaustralia.gov) 
compared to the NYSE were basic materials account for 6.50 % of the NYSE Composite Index 
(www.nyse.com/marketinfo/indexes/nya_characteristics.shtml). It should be recognised that because 
resource stock returns are more volatile than industrial stock returns [see Ball and Brown (1980)], it is likely 
that there will be more trading halts on the ASX than the NYSE. This is confirmed in Section 2.3 of this 
study. 
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This study recognises that Aitken, Frino, and Winn (1995) is the only empirical working 
paper that has examined the impact of trading halts in the Australian market. Nonetheless, it 
is noted that this study is the first in Australia to examine the impact of trading halts during a 
period when Australian listed companies were obliged to comply with stricter continuous 
disclosure requirements. Further, this study extends the work of Aitken, Frino and Winn 
(1995), by providing a more thorough investigation on the impact of trading halts on 
additional market quality variables, such as returns and order depth. Additionally, this study 
differs to others in that it examines the most comprehensive dataset of 18,245 trading halts, 
compared to Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995) who examine a relatively smaller sample of 
5,788 trading halts in Australia; and Fong (1996) who examine the largest sample of 1,512 
trading halts in the United States.  
 
The final motivation of this study is to provide ASX exchange officials with a better 
understanding of the trading behaviour surrounding trading halts, with which to fine-tune the 
market surveillance discipline. Trading halt statistics show that the number of trading halts to 
the number of listed shares on the ASX is significantly higher than those found in U.S. stock 
exchanges (see Table 2.1.). This significant disparity observed is puzzling and needs to be 
addressed. Perhaps, tighter continuous disclosure regulatory requirements for ASX listed 
stocks have exacerbated the exchange official’s inability to exercise accurate judgement 
when granting a trading halt request [see Stigler (1964)]. This would be particularly 
disturbing if trading halts are found to be detrimental to the market, in that they create an 
inequitable and disorderly market. Considering this valid concern, this study tests whether the 
impact of trading halts are a function of various exogenous variables such as firm size, 
trading halt duration, price change during a trading halt, and trading halt reason (i.e. 
announcement type). Upon analysing these results, the ASX might be able to improve its 
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screening process used to grant a trading halt request. Overall, these results would be of 
interest to the ASX and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC).  
 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes the institutional 
details for trading halt mechanisms on the ASX and other major markets. Chapter 3 provides 
a review of empirical work examining the impact of trading halts reported in U.S. and other 
overseas stock exchanges. This is followed in Chapter 4 by the theory and hypothesis 
development. Chapter 5 outlines the data and research methodology employed in this study. 
Chapter 6 presents the results and Chapter 7 provides conclusions with suggestions for 
possible areas of future research. 
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2. INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
This chapter provides an explanation of trading halts and their use in securities markets. 
Section 2.1 identifies the different types of trading halts and discusses their intended 
purposes. Section 2.2 presents the trading halt rules on the ASX. Section 2.3 examines the 
continuous disclosure regulation and its impact on the number of trading halts on the ASX. 
Finally, Section 2.4 examines trading halt rules on the NYSE and NASDAQ.  
2.1.  Types of Trading Halts 
Trading halts are tools used to address both potential and actual market disorder. IOSCO 
(2002) conducted a survey of trading halt policy from around the world and found that they 
occur most commonly in one of two sets of circumstances. In the first, the trading halt is 
designed to facilitate the orderly absorption by market users of new information material to 
the valuation placed on an issuer’s securities. The second main set of circumstances in which 
trading halts are used occurs when there is an order imbalance, excessive volatility or when 
there is some other indication of disorderly trading. In these cases, the trading halt generally 
provides time for supply and demand to rebalance at a new trading price. Based on IOSCO 
(2002), trading halts can generally be divided into two main categories, discretionary and 
automatic.  
2.1.1. Discretionary Trading Halts  
A discretionary trading halt refers to the essentially subjective actions of a market operator or 
regulatory authority to halt the trading in a security, or group of securities, on its market or 
within its jurisdiction. This type of trading halt is normally imposed in anticipation of the 
imminent release of material news about an issuer. This new information may change the 
fundamental value of the firm, therefore causing unavoidable fundamental volatility. Trading 
halts cannot reduce unavoidable fundamental volatility but rather aim to reduce any transitory 
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volatility by allowing the market to absorb information before being able to act upon it. The 
duration of discretionary trading halts varies depending on their purpose and whether the 
particular circumstances will affect a single security, a group of securities, or the market as a 
whole. 
2.1.2. Automatic Trading Halts  
An automatic trading halt refers to a trading halt triggered in a non-discretionary way on the 
basis of pre-set parameters (e.g., market rules). Such a halt stops trading when large 
fluctuations in a security’s price or the market more generally jeopardize an orderly 
marketplace. The duration of automatic trading halts is usually shorter than that of 
discretionary ones. Automatic trading halts are triggered if the reference variable (i.e., price 
or volume) of a security, or in some cases an index, exceeds preset limits. Automatic trading 
halts can therefore affect individual securities or the entire market. The parameters and 
conditions under which automatic trading halts occur are usually identified in rules adopted 
(and enforced) by the market operator.  
 
2.2. Trading Halt Rules on the ASX 
The rationale for imposing trading halts on the ASX is to maintain an orderly market, protect 
investors and maintain an efficient market5. Trading halt policy on the ASX is governed in 
both Chapter 16 of the Market rules and Chapter 17 of the Listing rules.  
                                                 
5
  These were rationales given by the ASX to the IOSCO (2002) report. 
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2.2.1. Chapter 16 of the ASX Market Rules 
Chapter 16 of the ASX Market Rules sets out that a trading halt may be imposed by the ASX 
if:  
• The ASX receives or releases an announcement in relation to an issuer which, in the 
opinion of ASX, is market sensitive; or 
• An issuer requests a trading halt and the ASX agrees to impose a trading halt. 
 
If a trading halt is called under Market Rule 16.4.2 securities are placed in pre-open6 
following receipt of a price sensitive announcement, or if after close then it will be placed in 
pre-open the next trading day. This period is usually 10 minutes, or 1 hour for takeover 
offers. During this time no trading will occur and the trading halt7 will end either at a time 
announced by the ASX or the commencement of open session on the second trading day 
following a halt. The ASX can suspend trading during a trading halt if no announcement is 
made within the required time frame. If the company believes two days is not enough then it 
can apply for voluntary suspension. In exceptional cases the company may apply for back to 
back trading halts that are capped at a maximum of 4 trading days.  
 
2.2.2. Chapter 17 of the ASX Listing Rules 
Chapter 17.1 of the Listing rules further sets out how trading halts can occur at the request of 
an issuer. When a trading halt is requested by an issuer, then the exchange is not required to 
act on the issuer’s request. This provides the exchange officials with the flexibility in their 
decision to initiate a trading halt. Chapter 17.2 of the listing rules also outlines trading 
                                                 
6
  Pre-open is the period before an opening call auction. Orders may be placed but trades can not be executed. 
7
 Paragraph 17 of guidance note 16, highlights that trading halts called by the ASX, when a price sensitive 
announcement is received are also known as temporary interruptions. For the purposes of this study they are 
referred to as trading halts. 
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suspensions on the ASX. This dissertation does not examine trading suspensions as they have 
different ramifications due to the different reason behind the halt to trading. 8  
2.3.   Continuous Disclosure 
A potential reason why there are so many trading halts on the ASX is the listing rule 
requirements for continuous disclosure. Introduced in 1994, the Australian continuous 
disclosure regime involves a contractual obligation between the ASX and companies 
admitted to public trading status on its market (listed companies), supported by federal 
corporations legislation (Corporations Act). The obligation is described in ASX Listing Rule 
3.1 in clear terms: 
“Once an entity is or becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable 
person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the entities securities, 
that entity must immediately tell the ASX that information.” 
 
There are exceptions to these rules including where all of the following are satisfied: 
1. A reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed; and  
2. The information is confidential; and  
3. One or more of the following applies: 
(a) It would be a breach of a law to disclose the information; or 
(b) The information concerns an incomplete proposal or negotiation; or 
(c) The information comprises matters of supposition or is insufficiently definite to 
warrant disclosure; or 
(d) The information is generated for the internal management purposes of the entity; or 
(e) The information is a trade secret. 
                                                 
8
  Trading suspensions can be initiated by the ASX or the listed entity.  Trading suspensions can be called by 
the ASX: if the entity is unwilling to comply with or breaks a listing rule, to prevent a disorderly or 
uninformed market, the ASX rules require the suspension; or if it is appropriate for some other reason. 
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In a report by the ASX on continuous disclosure in 2002 9 they outline: 
‘There can be circumstances where an entity is not able to make a preliminary announcement 
or is concerned that such an announcement is insufficient to properly inform the market. In 
these circumstances, the entity can ask ASX for a trading halt for up to two days. A trading 
halt is and is designed to be quite different from a suspension. A trading halt can also be an 
appropriate way of managing an unexplained price and/or volume change until an 
announcement can be made. Under Australian law and practice, if securities are suspended 
from trading, there can be negative implications in terms of financial covenants triggering 
repayment obligations and in terms of ability to issue transaction specific prospectuses. 
Trading halts do not have these consequences and can thus be used by companies as a tool of 
good disclosure policy in the interests of a fully informed, fair and transparent market.’ 
 
This report suggests that the ASX encourages the use of trading halts in many circumstances. 
The Continuous disclosure regime has placed pressure on listed companies to release greater 
amounts of information by announcements on the ASX. In turn, this has placed pressure on 
the ASX to impose trading halts requested by listed companies in order to meet their 
continuous disclosure obligations. Figure 2.1 displays the process by which announcements 
are released to the market. The announcement process begins with specialist ASX staff 
examining announcements to decide whether trading in the stock needs to be halted while the 
contents of the announcement are assessed by the market. This may be one of the reasons 
why there are so many trading halts on the ASX compared to any other market around the 
world (see Table 2.1). 
                                                 
9
 Continuous disclosure: The Australian Experience, 20 Feb 2002 available at www.asx.com.au. 
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Figure 2.1 Procedure for Company Announcements 
Information Releases: Process
Not Market Sensitive
Released to Public
(Signal G)
Market Information Department
Halt Procedures
Market Sensitive
Companies Officer
Market Sensitive?
ASX
Company Announcements Office
Document for Public Release
(Via Facsimile or Copy)
 
 
Table 2.1 Relative number of Trading Halts on the ASX, NYSE, NASDAQ, and LSE 
from Jan 2005-Oct 2006. 
Exchange Trading halts Listed issuers Trading halts as % of listed issuers 
ASX 18,505 2,014 918.81% 
NYSE 1,908 2,764 69.03% 
NASDAQ 844 3,388 24.91% 
LSE 63 1,606 3.92% 
Source: Trading halt statistics were obtained from exchange officials on the ASX, NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE.  
 
2.4.  Trading Halt Rules on the ASX vs other markets 
Markets such as the NYSE and NASDAQ are where most research has occurred and it is 
important to understand the institutional differences compared to the ASX. Table 2.2 
provides a comparative summary of stock-specific trading halt rules employed on the ASX, 
NYSE, NASDAQ and the LSE (London Stock Exchange).  
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Table 2.2 Trading Halt Rules on the ASX, NYSE, NASDAQ, and LSE 
Reason  for trading halt 
Exchange Type News 
pending 
Issuer 
request 
Order 
imbalance 
Exceeds  
pre-set 
limits 
Call 
auction 
after 
halt 
ASX Temporary Yes No No No Yes 
 
Long-term No Yes No No Yes 
NYSE Regulatory Yes Yes No No Yes 
 
Non-
regulatory No No Yes No Yes 
NASDAQ Temporary Yes Yes No Yes No 
LSE Temporary Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
The key differences between trading halt policy on the ASX and other major markets can be 
summarises as follows: 
• The ASX does not halt trading in order imbalance or price limit situations; 
• NYSE trading halts re-open with a ‘tattonement’ process followed by a call auction10, 
NASDAQ has no call auction and the ASX has a call auction; 
• Trading halts are institutionally imposed by the ASX and NASDAQ whereas on the 
NYSE they are usually called by the specialist. 
• Trading halts may be called at any time during the day most exchanges. On the NYSE 
most trading halts are delayed openings11, whereas on the ASX trading halts are more 
spread across the day and only 11.4% are delayed openings (see Table 7.1). The 
majority (83.4%) are called and re-open during the trading day.12 
                                                 
10
  On the NYSE, the specialist may engage in price exploration by issuing indicator quotes (known as 
tattonement). The specialist may change the indicator quotes up until re-opening, however upon re-opening 
these indicator quotes are binding on the specialist. Potential traders place commitments that give an 
indication of the likely re-opening price and a call auction is then initiated. 
11
  Delayed openings occur when trading halts are called after the market closes (Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) 
indicate 75% occur as delayed openings).  
12
  A more detailed analysis of NASDAQ and NYSE trading halts is provided by Madura, Richie and Tucker 
(2006) and Corwin and Lipson (2000) respectively. 
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3. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
The earliest literature on trading halts begins with Stigler (1964) who discusses the regulation 
of securities markets. Stigler criticises the exchange practice of suspending trading during 
order imbalance situations because of his doubts about exchange official’s ability to exercise 
accurate judgment in such situations. Stigler argues that trading delays help ‘free riders’ 
benefit from the public release of information during a trading suspension. He argues that 
free riders benefit from costless information gathering during a trading halt at the expense of 
informed traders.  
 
Despite the seminal work of Stigler (1964), trading halts were not immediately taken to be a 
topical issue until the earliest empirical work by Hopewell and Schwartz (1976), Hopewell 
and Schwartz (1978) and Kryzanowski (1979). Even with these studies, the literature 
developed slowly until the stock market crash of October 1987 (“Black Monday”). The 
aftermath of the 1987 crash saw high political passions for change, and much interest was 
raised for the use of trading halt mechanisms.  The following section examines the empirical 
literature surrounding this controversial issue. Table 3.1 demonstrates the mixed opinions 
surrounding trading halts and provides a summary of the empirical literature relating to 
trading halts. 
 
3.1. Trading Halts are Beneficial for the Market 
Proponents of trading halts contend that trading halts maintain price stability, facilitate an 
orderly market and keep transaction costs low. Market authorities employ trading halts to 
‘allow the market to absorb the material information and reflect it in the price of the security 
in an orderly manner’ (IOSCO (2002)). This section reviews the literature that finds trading 
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halts do obtain these objectives and are beneficial to the market. Evidence from the U.S is 
reviewed followed by evidence from the rest of the world.  
3.1.1. Evidence from the U.S 
Hopewell and Schwartz (1978) examine daily abnormal returns for 948 temporary trading 
suspensions on the NYSE during 1974-1975. They use a market model to calculate the 
abnormal returns and find anticipatory price reactions for trade imbalance halts and good 
news halts leading up to the halt, and none for bad news halts. Post-halt returns are close to 
zero on average, though there is some evidence that post-halt returns of good news (bad 
news) halts are significantly positive (negative), implying that price adjustments at the re-
opening are incomplete. The authors conclude that these inefficiencies cannot be exploited 
profitably after considering typical transactions costs. There is also no sign of price reversals 
over the six days following the halt, suggesting that the price discovery process does not 
typically overreact to the information associated with the trading halt. Overall, their results 
suggest a reasonably efficient market reaction to significant new information. However, since 
efficient adjustment might have occurred without suspension or with suspensions of shorter 
duration, the authors are hesitant to endorse the NYSE administration of temporary trading 
suspensions. 
 
Fabozzi and Ma (1988) examine over-the-counter (OTC) activities for NYSE stocks during a 
trading halt. Using trade-by-trade data for 314 halts during 1985, they find that OTC trading 
is characterized by high volatility. They find that the first transaction price during the halt is 
an unbiased estimate of the eventual NYSE re-opening price. However, there are no apparent 
opportunities for arbitrage profits and their results suggest that trading halts are successful in 
curbing excess volatility.  
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Howe and Schlarbaum (1986) explore the price behaviour of a sample of 165 corporate 
securities in which trading was temporarily suspended from 1959-1979. The authors argue 
that a suspension increases the equality of information dispersion in three ways: (1) it allows 
wide dissemination of information via mass media; (2) it removes the possible advantage 
possessed by insiders and professional traders arising from quick access to the market; and 
(3) it eliminates any advantage that insiders and professionals may have over "part-time" 
investors attributable to the ability to assess faster the impact of news on security price. It is 
important to note that SEC trading suspensions differ from the trading halts. SEC suspensions 
are regulatory actions intended to protect investors and coincide with substantial devaluations 
of the suspended securities. They find significant and prolonged negative abnormal returns in 
the post-suspension period. Their results show that suspensions from a regulatory body tend 
to coincide with a significant devaluation of securities.  
 
Chen, Chen and Valerio (2003) use a sample of 999 trading halts during 1992 from the 
NYSE to examine their impact on price discovery. This study finds that trading halts help 
dissipate information and facilitate the price-discovery process. They find that trading halts 
can help reduce price dispersion when trading is halted due to the fact that some significant 
news has already been announced and the market needs more time to digest the information. 
Whereas when halts are called for the impending release of news that will have little 
significance, then it is found that trading halts actually induce noisier prices and undermine 
the price discovery process.  
 
Madura, Richie and Tucker (2006) extend the literature on price discovery by using daily and 
intra-day data to examine the price contribution of the trading halt period relative to total 
price discovery. They assess 656 trading halts during 1998, from the NASDAQ. They 
conduct analyses on nine different sub samples that are separated by type of news to examine 
 23 
whether the impact of a trading halt varies with the type of news event. They find that 
abnormal returns during trading halts are more pronounced for anticipated events and for 
their respective sub samples. Weighted price contributions before and during the halts are 
directly related to firm size. Pre-halt weighted price contributions are lower for surprise 
events and for some specific news categories. Overall, the price discovery is concentrated in 
the halt period, but the timing of the price discovery varies by the type of information.  
3.1.2. Evidence from Other Overseas Exchanges 
Kryzanowski (1979) tests the efficiency of trading suspensions in the Canadian market. This 
study examines trading suspensions that were issued in order to prevent the exploitation of 
monopoly information by forcing the public disclosure of previously private firm-specific 
information. He uses weekly data for a sample of 120 halts from the Canadian markets during 
1963-1977.  He examines abnormal returns for 40 weeks around each halt and finds the 
market was only efficient in the semi-strong form for favourable information public 
disclosures. Suggesting that there seems to be lags and frictions in the downward adjustment 
of security prices because "selling short" may be a less effective market mechanism for the 
adjustment of security prices than "buying long". "Selling short" could be less effective than 
"buying long" because it entails both a greater "downside" risk and more stringent 
institutional constraints (such as the "zero-up-tick"13 rule and margin requirements).  This 
finding prompted other studies to divide results into good and bad news halts to determine 
whether there is a difference.  
 
                                                 
13
  Zero-up-tick rule places restrictions on when a short sale may be executed. Short sales can only be made 
when there is no price change in the last trade price. The previous trade price must be higher than the trade 
price that preceded it.  
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DeRidder (1990) examines 277 one-day trading suspensions on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange between 1 January 1980 and 30 June 1988. He finds that the market is efficient and 
prices adjust to the new equilibrium price immediately after the suspensions. 
 
Bildik (2004) assesses the efficiency of trading halts by examining return, volatility and 
volume behaviour around news-initiated trading halts on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). 
He investigates, for the first time, the trading behaviour of different types of investors such as 
individuals, mutual funds and brokerage houses around trading halts. This study uses event 
study methodology on a sample of 323 halts from 1999-2003 for a period of eighty, 15 
minute intervals centred on a halt. The findings show that most of the new information is 
absorbed by prices within fifteen minutes (almost completely in an hour) following the 
resumption of trading after a halt. The Reaction of investors to bad news is slower and 
stronger than good news. He also finds that institutional investors take the price advantage of 
new information during the halt period ahead of the individual investors. Institutional 
investors systematically buy and sell at more favourable prices around halts than individual 
investors do. Finally, he concludes by suggesting that trading halts are effective in 
dissemination of valuable information and play an important role in enhancing the efficiency 
of the price discovery mechanism. 
 
Engelen and Kabir (2006) examine the overall efficiency of trading suspensions to 
disseminate new information among market participants on the Euronext Brussels. The 
sample investigated contains suspensions related to the disclosure of new information to the 
capital market. Using a sample of 102 suspensions from 1992-2000 they analyse the stock 
return behaviour surrounding trading suspensions by using event study methodology. They 
analyse a 41-day event window that encompasses the event day and 20 trading days before 
and after suspension.  Their results show that there is no anticipatory behaviour before 
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trading suspensions or any significant abnormal return pattern in the post-suspension period. 
This indicates that there is a complete and instantaneous adjustment to the new information 
released during trading suspensions. They also find that there is an increase in trading volume 
after the suspension. However, there was no significant change in volatility before and after 
the suspension. These results, again, suggest that information released during the trading 
suspension, is fully incorporated in stock prices. Overall their results indicate the efficacy of 
trading suspensions to disseminate price sensitive new information among market 
participants. 
 
Hauser, Kedar-Levy, Pilo and Shurki (2006) examine the speed of price adjustment following 
a trading halt event, and the factors influencing it. Using a dataset of 73 halts during 2001 on 
the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) they compare the magnitude and pace of investors’ 
reaction to announcements of similar content and value, with and without trading halts. This 
is similar to a pseudo-halt [used by Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994)], except that this method 
uses a matched security rather than the same security.  This study controls for content factors 
with one control group with the same announcement type and a second control group with a 
price change of comparable value. Both are controlled for industrial sector, time-of-the-day 
and trading volume. The main finding is that the information contained in the announcement 
is disseminated faster when a trading halt is imposed, indicating a more efficient price 
discovery in such cases. They find that information dissemination following trading halts is 
over 40% faster and that abnormal trading activity is positively related to the speed of price 
adjustment. 
 
 
Kim, Yagüe and Yang (2007) study the relative performance of trading halts and price limits 
using data from the Spanish Stock Exchange. Both trading halts and price limits result in 
increased trading activity while trading halts seem to perform better than price limits in terms 
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of liquidity. Spreads decrease and depths increase following trading halts, but the opposite 
occurs for price limits. These findings differ from the results of Corwin and Lipson (2000) 
who find that bid-ask spreads increase while depth near the best quotes decrease. However 
the results of Kim, Yagüe and Yang (2007) are not comparative to Corwin and Lipson (2000) 
because of the use of daily data in this study. Furthermore their aim is to compare the relative 
performance of trading halts and price limits rather than the isolated impact of trading halts.   
 
3.2.   Trading Halts are NOT beneficial for the Market 
Opponents, contend that trading halts prevent prices from reaching their equilibrium level, 
cause higher volatility in subsequent periods and disrupt the normal functioning of an 
exchange (Kim and Rhee (1997)). Fama (1989) argues that mandatory trading halts increase, 
rather than reduce, volatility by inciting trading in anticipation of halts. He highlights that, if 
the rationale for imposing trading halts is to provide investors a cooling-off period to evaluate 
information, ‘homemade’ trading halts are readily available. That is, ‘home made’ trading 
halts are available to any investor who requires time to analyse market events. This section 
reviews the literature that finds trading halts are not beneficial to the market. Evidence from 
the U.S is reviewed followed by evidence from the rest of the world.  
 
3.2.1. Evidence from the U.S 
Ferris, Kumar and Wolfe (1992) examine the effect of SEC suspensions on returns, volume 
and volatility using a sample of 40 suspensions from 1963-1987. Consistent with Howe and 
Schlarbaum (1986) they find that there is a significant devaluation following a suspension. 
They also find that volume and volatility both increase post-suspension and do not return to 
normal for about 20 days after the suspension. The authors conclude that trading suspensions 
are not associated with the immediate elimination of unusual market activity. 
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In Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) the volume and volatility surrounding 852 trading halts on 
the NYSE during 1988 are examined. Using intra-day data in half hour intervals they 
investigate the levels of trading volume and price volatility surrounding trading halts relative 
to a “pseudo-halt”. A “pseudo-halt” is a control period of continuous trading for the same 
firm, matched on time-of-day and halt duration. To further control for the amount of 
information released during a trading halt they also match halt observations to pseudo-halts 
with net-of market returns14 of similar size. The authors recognise that this method can lead 
to a sample selection bias because not all trading halts can be matched with pseudo-halts. 
This results in trading halts with extremely large absolute price moves being excluded that 
reduces the power of the tests. The resulting selection bias narrows the scope of the 
conclusions to trading halts with relatively small halt returns. They find that volume and 
volatility is significantly higher in the first full trading day after a trading halt than following 
pseudo-halts. Higher post-halt volume is observed into the third day while higher post-halt 
volatility decays within hours. They conclude trading halts do not having a calming down 
effect on the market that allows for the orderly emergence of a new consensus price. 
 
Fong (1996) uses similar methodology to Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) to examine 1512 
trading halts on the NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) from 1988-1989. The 
results are similar to Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) except the duration of excess post-halt 
volatility is less than half (Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) find 4 hours). Fong (1996) posits 
the duration of excess post-halt volatility may be significantly shorter due to the different 
methods used in identifying pseudo-halts. This study matches halts based on pure excess 
returns whereas Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) match based on absolute excess returns. Also, 
Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) pseudo-halts could come from the second trading day in the 
                                                 
14
  Net-of market returns are the return for the halted stock less the return on the market index. 
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post-halt period so that the events underlying the trading halts might affect the post pseudo-
halt volatility. Fong (1996) corrects for this by ensuring that the pseudo-halt is not within 10 
days of the halt.  
 
Corwin and Lipson (2000) analyse the effects of trading halts on order flow, spreads, and the 
limit order book. Using a data set of 295 NYSE trading halts from 1995-1996 they also 
examine the relationships between the limit order book and the re-opening price as well as 
liquidity and post-halt volatility. They find that market and limit order submissions and 
cancellations increase significantly during trading halts. They also find that a large proportion 
of the limit order book at the re-open is composed of orders submitted during the halt, and 
that the market-clearing price at the re-open is a good predictor of future prices. Order depth 
near the quotes is unusually low before, during, and after trading halts. This reduction likely 
reflects investors' reduced willingness to supply liquidity at these times. However, they do 
find that total depth after a trading halt increases. This reflects uncertainty in the market as 
traders are not willing to place orders near the best quotes.  In examining bid-ask spreads, 
they find that the quoted spread and several measures of limit order book spread are 
unusually high at the re-open. This increase generally dissipates within two minutes for order 
imbalance halts and within 30 minutes for news halts. Consistent with Lee, Ready and Seguin 
(1994), they find that both volume and volatility increase significantly after NYSE trading 
halts. 
 
Christie, Corwin and Harris (2002) study the effects of alternative halt and re-opening 
procedures on prices, transaction costs, and trading activity for a sample of news-related 
trading halts on NASDAQ. Studying 1167 trading halts from 1997-1998 they find that post-
halt volatility and transaction cost effects are significantly larger following NASDAQ halts 
re-opened with a 5-minute quotation period than for either NASDAQ halts re-opened with a 
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90-minute quotation period or NYSE halts. These results are consistent with Greenwald and 
Stein (1991), who show that trading halts allow for information dissemination during market 
closures which can improve market liquidity. They also find that trading halts are followed 
by unusually high volatility even when the halt mechanism allows for information 
transmission during the halt. Their results also show that trade size is unusually low 
immediately after NASDAQ halts suggesting that market makers are unwilling to commit to 
large trades during this period of high uncertainty. 
3.2.2. Evidence from Other Overseas Exchanges 
Kabir (1994) investigates share price behaviour associated with a sample of 426 trading 
suspensions on the LSE from 1970-1988. Using monthly returns this study detects the 
presence of significant positive abnormal return in the month immediately following trading 
reinstatement. This finding casts doubt on the belief that trading suspension results in wide 
dissemination of information among investors. It also indicates that either the complete 
impact of new information release takes place only gradually, or not all relevant information 
is disclosed during the suspension period.  
 
Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995) examine the effects of information related trading halts on 
price discovery on the Australian Stock Exchange. This study examines a market setting with 
a substantially different re-opening to the NYSE to determine the robustness of the finding by 
Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994). They further extend the work of Lee, Ready and Seguin 
(1994) by examining the effect of trading halts on bid-ask spreads in addition to trading 
volume and price volatility. They use a sample of 5,788 trading halts on individual securities 
that are accompanied by an information release from 1992-1995. This study adopts the 
pseudo-halt methodology from Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) to examine eighty half-hour 
intervals centred on the halt. They find that a halt is typically associated with significantly 
greater trading volume for less than a day preceding the halt and for over two days 
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subsequent to the halt. Over the same period, halts resulted in abnormally high volatility 
compared to pseudo-halt periods with similar amounts of information but no halt. Despite the 
significant amount of news released around the halt, there were marked increases in 
uncertainty and costs to trading. Consistent with Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) they find that 
halts hinder the price discovery process around informative news releases.  
 
Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (1998) examine a sample of 412 trading halts, from 1988-1990, 
using 20 half hour intervals from the Montreal Stock Exchange (MSE). They find that both 
volatility and volume increase after a halt as new information is incorporated into the price. 
Much of this information is found to be incorporated into the price within half an hour. Their 
results again support the hypothesis that closures merely delay the resolution of uncertainty. 
The results are again mostly consistent with Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) but find halts are 
less of an impediment than on the NYSE. The authors believe this may be due to the open 
order book or smaller order flow on the MSE. 
 
Wu (1998) evaluates the effectiveness of trading suspensions from the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange on price discovery, return volatility and volume. Using daily data from 1986-1993 
this study examines 522 suspensions for 30 days either side of the halt. The findings show 
that the stock prices adjust to new information quickly during the suspension. The results 
further show that trading volatility increases in the post-suspension period, and the post-
suspension volatility is relatively higher for mandatory suspensions than for voluntary 
suspensions. This study also finds that turnover rises significantly in the post-suspension 
period for both suspensions and is the highest on the first day of re-opening. Wu (1998) 
provides evidence that the market reactions are sensitive to the announced reason for the 
suspension. The returns and volatility changed substantially around mergers, acquisitions and 
private placement suspensions, but they did not show significant changes around privatization 
 31 
halts. This suggests that the nature of suspension news may be a factor in explaining the 
market behaviour around trading suspensions. 
 
Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (2001) use intra-day quotes and transactions on halted securities 
from the MSE and Toronto Stock Exchanges (TSE) to decompose the spreads and examine 
quoted depths. Using a data set of 96 trading halts from 1988-1990 they analyse trading halts 
using, 30 minute intervals centred on each halt. Their results show that the adverse-selection 
component of the spread is higher around trading halts and highest at the trading halt. 
Furthermore, the authors find that whether print media articles appeared within four days of 
the halt, has no apparent impact on the time-series behaviour of the spread components. News 
announcements prior to trading resumption and information that specialists obtain from the 
order flow during the first few hours of post-halt trading resolve most of the asymmetric 
information associated with a halt.  
 
Tan and Yeo (2003) examine 470 voluntary trading suspensions on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange (SSE) from 1986-1995. This study uses daily data for a period of 60 days around 
each suspension and sub-groups firm-initiated suspensions into ‘favourable news’ and 
‘unfavourable news’ suspensions. The ‘favourable news’ group experiences significant 
positive abnormal returns around the event date. Conversely the ‘unfavourable news’ group, 
shows a prolonged decline. The high trading volumes in the pre and post-suspension periods 
suggest that firm-initiated suspensions on the SSE involve the release of new sensitive 
information. Firm initiated trading suspensions are also accompanied by increases in post-
suspension return volatility. 
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3.3.   Other Studies  
This section reviews literature relating to trading halts that do not directly imply that trading 
halts are beneficial or not to the market. Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1998) examine the 
NYSE's ability to maintain an open trading environment by conducting a cross-sectional 
analysis of all trading suspensions that occurred during the period 1974-1988 on the NYSE. 
They find that the NYSE has improved its ability to absorb more extreme news by shortening 
halt durations. They show that there is a significant difference between news-pending and 
order-imbalance related suspensions. They find that order-imbalance suspensions have 
significant return reversals, whereas the news-pending suspensions have significant return 
persistence. If a suspension occurs for inventory-related reasons, then after trade resumes, the 
stock’s price will head back toward the pre-suspension price as the dealer’s inventory returns 
to its desired level. The size of the firm also appears to play a large role in the duration of a 
suspension. 
 
Masulis and Shivakumar (2002) examine whether different market microstructures affect the 
speed at which new information is incorporated into prices (speed of price discovery). Using 
transactions data, they compare the price reaction speeds on NASDAQ with those on the 
NYSE and the AMEX. Specialists have an affirmative obligation to stabilize prices, which 
creates incentives for them to buy some stock when prices are falling, especially in the face 
of temporary order imbalances. Therefore they believe that the speed of adjustment should be 
slower on the NYSE/AMEX than the NASDAQ. Also trading halts on NASDAQ are allowed 
only for pending or actual news announcements and not for order imbalances.  
 
Consistent with their hypotheses Masulis and Shivakumar (2002) find that price adjustments 
are quicker by as much as one hour on the NASDAQ. This result is not due to differences in 
issuer characteristics or announcement effects across the markets, but due to differences in 
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market structures. Greater risk taking by dealers, more rapid order execution, and more 
frequent informed trading on NASDAQ, as well as stale limit orders and a less efficient 
opening price-setting mechanism on the NYSE/AMEX, all contribute to faster stock price 
adjustments on NASDAQ. This study confirms that market structure differences can have a 
significant impact on the market.  
Kim and Yang (2004) provide a survey of the trading halt literature and analyse what makes 
them attractive to financial markets. The literature suggests that trading halts do not reduce 
volatility or volume in stock markets, instead, both volume and volatility increase after a 
trading halt. The authors discuss how regulators argue trading halts lessen the breakdown in 
the transmission of information among market participants, and their very existence seems to 
suggest that the advantage is at least great enough to cover the costs. However, they conclude 
that further research is necessary to justify this net advantage of trading halts.  
3.4.   Empirical Literature Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the existing research in the area of trading halts and it is clear that 
some questions have been answered while many remain unknown. From the literature, it is 
almost widely accepted that volume and volatility are abnormally high around trading halts. 
This has been confirmed by many studies on markets with differing microstructures.15 Other 
market quality indicators have not been looked at as extensively such as bid-ask spreads and 
market depth. Corwin and Lipson (2000) are one of the few papers that examine bid-ask 
spreads and they find that they widen around trading halts. However this result has not been 
confirmed extensively with only a few papers in this area.16 Market depth has only been 
examined by Corwin and Lipson (2000) and they find that depth near the best quotes falls 
after a trading halt. This result is yet to been confirmed or denied by any other studies or on 
                                                 
15
  Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994), Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995) and Corwin and Lipson (2000) are examples. 
16
  Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995) and Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (1998) are others to date. 
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any other market microstructure including the ASX. Many studies have examined the price 
discovery process around trading halts and many find that trading halts are efficient, with 
abnormal returns disappearing quickly. This has never been tested on the ASX and this 
dissertation examines abnormal return behaviour around trading halts  
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Table 3.1  Review of Empirical Literature Examining the Impact of Trading Halts on Equity Markets 
Study Market No. of Halts (Sample period) 
Event 
Window 
Variables 
Examined Halt Type Main findings 
A. Literature that finds trading halts are beneficial for the market 
U.S Markets 
Hopewell and 
Schwartz (1978) NYSE 
948 
(1974-1975) 
[-6,6] 
Daily Returns 
News and 
order 
imbalance 
Efficient market reaction to significant new information. However, since 
efficient adjustment might have occurred without suspension or with 
suspensions of shorter duration. They are hesitant to endorse the NYSE 
administration of temporary trading suspensions. 
Fabozzi and Ma 
(1988) 
NYSE 
NASDAQ 
314 
(1985) 
[0,42]      
Minute Volatility 
News and 
order 
imbalance 
Trading halts are successful in curbing excess volatility. 
 
Howe and 
Schlarbaum 
(1986) 
 
NYSE 165 (1959-1979) 
[-40,40] 
Weekly 
[-5,5] 
Daily 
Returns SEC 
suspensions 
Suspensions are found to coincide with substantial devaluations of the 
suspended securities. Further, significant and prolonged negative abnormal 
returns are observed in the post-suspension period, an apparent violation of 
semi-strong form market efficiency. 
Chen, Chen, and 
Valerio (2003) NYSE 
999 
(1992) Daily Price dispersion 
News and 
order 
imbalance 
Trading halts help disseminate information and facilitate the price-discovery 
process. 
 
Madura, Richie 
and Tucker 
(2006) 
 
NASDAQ 656 (1998) 
[-3,3] 
Daily 
Returns 
 
 
News 
Price discovery is concentrated in the halt period, which suggests trading 
halt are efficient. Stock price adjustments surrounding trading halts are 
conditioned on the underlying event that caused the halt 
Outside the U.S 
Kryzanowski 
(1979) 
TSE, CSE, 
MSE & 
VSE 17 
120 
(1963-1977) 
[-40,40] 
Weekly Returns News 
The market is efficient in the semi-strong form for favourable but not 
unfavourable information public disclosures, suggesting that there seem to 
be a lags and frictions in the downward adjustment of security prices. 
Bildik (2004) 
 
ISE18 
 
323 
(1999-2003) 
[-40,40] 
15 min 
Volume, 
volatility & 
returns 
 
News 
 
Institutional investors take the price advantage of new information during 
the halt period ahead of the individual investors by better timing in trading 
after halts. He suggests that trading halts are effective in the dissemination 
of valuable information and play an important role in enhancing the 
efficiency of the price discovery mechanism. 
                                                 
17
  Toronto, Canadian, Montreal and Vancouver Stock Exchanges respectively 
18
  Istanbul Stock Exchange 
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Study Market No. of Halts (Sample period) 
Event 
Window 
Variables 
Examined Halt Type Main findings 
(Continued) A. Literature that finds trading halts are beneficial for the market - Outside the U.S 
Engelen and 
Kabir (2006) 
 
Euronext 
Brussels 
 
102 
(1992-2000) 
 
[-20,20] 
daily 
Returns, 
volume & 
volatility 
News  
The disclosure of new information and the time obtained by investors to 
evaluate this information appear to produce no destabilizing effect on the 
stock market. 
Hauser, Kedar-
Levy, Pilo and  
Shurki(2006) 
TASE19 73 (2001) 
[-2,21] 
5 min Returns News  
The information dissemination following trading halts is over 40% faster 
when a trading halt is imposed, indicating a more efficient price discovery 
during trading halts. 
B. Literature that finds trading halts are NOT beneficial for the market 
U.S Markets 
Ferris, Kumar 
and Wolfe (1992) 
NYSE 
AMEX 
40 
(1963-1987) 
[-30,30] 
Daily 
Returns, 
volatility & 
volume 
SEC 
suspensions 
Suspensions are associated with high unusual activity. Volume and variance 
are abnormally high. 
Lee, Ready and 
Seguin (1994) 
 
NYSE 852                 (1988) 
[-13,13] 
30 min 
Volatility & 
volume 
 
News and 
order 
imbalance 
Volume and volatility for the trading day following the halt are significantly 
larger than corresponding measures following the matched pseudo-halt. The 
act of calling the halt does not generally achieve the objective of creating a 
"calming down" period that allows for the emergence of a new consensus 
price in an orderly fashion. 
Fong (1996) NYSE AMEX 
1512 
(1988-89) 
 
[0,13] 
30 min Volatility 
News and 
order 
imbalance 
Post-halt volatility is significantly larger than the post pseudo-halt volatility 
for less than two trading hours. The duration of excess post-halt volatility 
found in this study is less than half of that found in Lee, Ready and Seguin 
(1994). 
Corwin and 
Lipson (2000) NYSE 
295 
(1995-1996) 
Trade & 
30 min 
Volume, 
volatility, 
depth, spreads   
& order flow 
News and 
order 
imbalance 
Market and limit order submissions and cancellations increase significantly 
during trading halts. Depth near the quotes is unusually low around trading 
halts, though specialists and/or floor traders appear to provide additional 
liquidity at these times. Finally, specialists appear to "spread the quote" 
prior to imbalance halts to convey information to market participants. 
Christie, Corwin 
and Harris (2002) NASDAQ 
1167 
(1997-1998) 
[-4,4] 
30 min 
Volatility, 
volume & 
spreads. 
 
News  
Post-halt volatility and transaction cost effects are significantly larger 
following NASDAQ halts re-opened with a 5-minute quotation period than 
for either NASDAQ halts re-opened with a 90-minute quotation period or 
NYSE halts. 
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Study Market No. of Halts (Sample period) 
Event 
Window 
Variables 
Examined Halt Type Main findings 
Outside the U.S 
Kabir (1994) LSE 426 (1970-1988) 
[-5,5] 
Monthly 
Returns 
 
News and 
order 
imbalance 
Presence of significant positive abnormal returns in the month immediately 
following the trading reinstatement. This finding casts doubt on the belief 
that trading suspension results in wide dissemination of information among 
investors.  
Aitken, Frino and 
Winn (1996) 
 
ASX 5,788              (1992-1995) 
[-40,40] 
30 min 
Volatility, 
volume & 
spreads. 
News  
Significantly greater trading volume and volatility for less than a day 
preceding the halt and for over two days subsequent to the halt. Market bid 
ask spreads also increased significantly in the period following a halt. 
Trading halts appears to hinder the price discovery process around 
informative news releases.  
Kryzanowski and 
Nemiroff (1998) MSE 
412 
(1988-1990) 
[-10,10] 
30 min 
Returns, 
volatility & 
volume 
News and 
order 
imbalance 
The results are consistent with Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) but appear 
halts appear to less of an impediment than on the NYSE. They believe this 
may be due to the open order book or smaller order flow. 
Wu (1998) SEHK20 522 (1986-1993) 
[-30,30]      
Daily 
 
Returns, 
volatility & 
volume 
News  
Findings are consistent with Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) suggesting that 
suspensions may not effectively ease unusual market activities immediately. 
Results suggest that the nature of suspension news may be a factor in 
explaining the market behaviour around trading suspensions. 
Kryzanowski and 
Nemiroff (2001) 
MSE 
TSE 
96 
(1988-1990) 
[-130,130] 
30 min Spreads News  
Their results show that the adverse-selection component of the spread is 
higher around trading halts and highest at the trading halt. 
Tan and Yeo 
(2003) 
 
SSE21 470 (1986-1995) 
[-30,30] 
Daily 
Returns, volume 
& volatility 
News and 
firm initiated 
The ‘favourable news’ group experiences significantly positive abnormal 
returns around the event date. The ‘unfavourable news’ group, on the other 
hand, suffers a prolonged decline. High trading volumes in the pre and post-
suspension periods are also accompanied by increases in post-suspension 
return volatility. 
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4. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Several theories and hypotheses have been developed to explain the impact of non-trading 
periods on liquidity, volatility and stock returns. These hypotheses are developed below, in 
relation to the impact of trading halts.  
4.1.  Liquidity Impacts 
4.1.1. Trading Volume 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) develop a theory in which concentrated trading patterns arise 
endogenously because of the strategic behaviour of liquidity traders and informed traders. 
Their results show how trading volume will be elevated after a non-trading period, 
suggesting that trading volume will be abnormally high following a trading halt. 
Consistently, trading volume is expected to increase due to the need of investors to trade for 
liquidity and portfolio rebalancing purposes after receiving new information. This is 
consistent with the empirical studies of Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995), Lee, Ready and 
Seguin (1994) and Corwin and Lipson (2000). This view leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Trading volume for halted stocks should be relatively higher than for control stocks 
in the post-halt trading period.  
 
Increases in abnormal trading volume found after a trading halt should be of concern to any 
market participant because this can lead to higher volatility due to the positive relationship 
documented in previous studies [(French and Roll (1986) and Harris (1986)). As noted 
earlier, higher levels of volatility after a trading halt would be of concern to regulators as a 
main purpose of trading halts is to curb excess volatility. 
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4.1.2. Bid-ask Spreads 
Market regulators posit that trading halts protect investors from high levels of information 
asymmetry, which can lead to high transaction costs. If trading halts are successful in 
reducing uncertainty, then bid-ask spreads should decrease following a trading halt. 
However, there is a growing body of literature with models of ‘learn-by-trading’ (e.g., 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Grundy and McNichols (1989), Brown and Jennings (1989), 
and Leach and Madhavan (1993)). In these models, equilibrium prices are ‘discovered’ 
through the trading process, where uninformed traders infer the information held by 
informed traders by trading with (or against) them. Consequently, following a period of trade 
suspension, uninformed traders will experiment with a series of “trial’ prices, learning the 
true equilibrium price through the responses of informed traders. 
 
 Leach and Madhavan (1993) show that dealers will widen spreads in order to reduce the 
relative number of noise traders and to obtain a clearer information signal from trade prices 
and order flow. Madhavan (1992) and Subrahmanyam (1997) also suggests that trading halts 
could exacerbate the problem of information asymmetry, as traders can no longer observe 
prices. Overall, ‘learn-by-trading’ models predict that the loss in price discovery associated 
with trading halts will result in wider spreads when trading resumes. This leads to the second 
hypothesis: 
 
H2:  Bid-ask spreads of halted stocks should be immediately wider than for control stocks 
in the post-halt trading period.  
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4.1.3. Order Depth 
Greenwald and Stein (1991) present a model where a large order imbalance may increase 
short-term volatility and decrease liquidity. They demonstrate that in this situation, 
transactional risk becomes high, causing investors to panic and withdraw liquidity from the 
market. Greenwald and Stein (1991) argue in circumstances where there is a supply shock, it 
may be beneficial to sacrifice timely execution by initiating a trading halt. This allows 
liquidity suppliers with the time needed to enter the market and provide the necessary 
liquidity to stabilise the market. Overall, the sequence of these events suggest that trading 
halts increase total order depth, which should result in abnormally high levels around trading 
halts.  
 
By contrast, the learn-by-trading models posit that information asymmetry will be at its 
highest immediately after a trading halt. Subsequently, order depth for halted stocks is 
anticipated to be low during this period. This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of 
Brockman and Chung (1999) who demonstrate the existence of a negative relationship 
between order depth and information asymmetry on the order driven market of the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). Furthermore, Chung, Van Neese and Van Ness (1999) 
argue that when there are few limit orders outstanding, spreads will be wider because of the 
lack of competition. Upon examination of order depth around trading halts for a sample of 
U.S stocks, Corwin and Lipson (2000) find that total order depth increases after a trading 
halt. However, order depth near the best quote is found to be relatively low. This reflects the 
presence of uncertainty in the market, as traders are willing to be in the market but not near 
the best quotes.  
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These views lead to the following hypotheses: 
H3:  Total order depth of halted stocks should be immediately higher than those for 
control stocks during the post-halt trading period.  
 
H4: Order depth at the best quotes for halted stocks should be lower than those for 
control stocks around a trading halt.  
4.2.   Volatility Impacts  
A number of empirical papers have noted the positive relationship between trading volume 
and volatility. Notably, Schwert (1989) finds that growth in trading volume is positively 
related to an increase in monthly stock return volatility. French and Roll (1986) also show 
that volatility is higher when the market is open than when it is closed, suggesting that 
trading activity is an important contributor of short-run volatility. Brailsford (1995) utilises 
the auto regressive conditional heteroskedascity (ARCH) class of models to examine the 
impact of market closures on conditional volatility in the Australian equity market. He shows 
market closures are associated with an increase in conditional variance after the market 
closure. This finding suggests that the production of information over the market closure 
affects volatility once the market re-opens. 
 
Stoll and Whaley (1990) argue that a trading halt is reasonable only if the procedure for re-
opening leads to prices that more truly reflect security value. They find that the volatility of 
open-to-open returns is greater than close-to-close returns. This result could be explained by 
private information being revealed through the trading process, which supports the ‘learn-by-
trading’ class of models. Consistently, Gerety and Mulherin (1994) find that volatility 
dissipates throughout the trading day and contend that the act of  closing markets interrupts 
information flow and increases transitory volatility.  
 
 42 
Gerety and Mulherin (1992) highlight a fundamental cost of closing markets because some 
investors wish to shed the risk of holding positions when the market is closed. Trading halts 
prevent such a transfer and can cause investors to overreact and leave the market more 
quickly than if a circuit breaker did not exist. Further, Gerety and Mulherin (1992) provide 
support for the idea that trading facilitates the incorporation of information into security 
prices (‘learn-by-trade’ models). Consequently, it is hypothesised that the trading behaviour 
of price volatility in halted stocks should be similar to those predicted for trading volume.  
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H5:  Volatility for halted stocks should be relatively higher than those for control stocks in 
the post-halt trading period. 
4.3.   Return Impacts 
Trading halts are tools that provide a non-trading period, where market sensitive information 
can be efficiently disseminated into the halted stock price, before trading resumes. Trading 
halts are assumed to be installed unpredictably and withdrawn when full disclosure of 
information takes place. Considering this, it is hypothesised that there should not be any 
abnormal return behaviour around trading halts. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H6:  Abnormal returns in the pre and post-halt period should not be significantly different 
from zero. 
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4.4. Impact of Halt duration, Market capitalisation and Announcement 
type  
Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1998) find that the NYSE has improved its ability to absorb more 
extreme news by using shorter halt durations. Conversely, Christie, Corwin and Harris 
(2002) find that post-halt price volatility and transaction cost impacts are significantly larger 
following NASDAQ halts that are re-opened with a 5-minute quotation period than for 
NASDAQ halts re-opened with a 90-minute quotation period. This is consistent with 
Greenwald and Stein (1991), who suggest that longer trading halts will allow time for greater 
information dissemination and allow time for liquidity suppliers to enter the market. 
Consequently, it is anticipated that trading halts with longer durations allow for increased 
resolution of uncertainty as reflected by narrower spreads and lower volatility in the post-
halt trading period. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
 
H7:  Trading halts with longer durations should have narrower spreads and lower 
volatility in the immediate post-halt trading period. 
 
Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (2000) contend that variance uncertainty and asymmetric 
information is lower for larger stocks because they have greater analyst coverage and are 
widely held. Subsequently, they suggest that the cessation of trade due to impending public 
disclosures should occur less often for larger stocks. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H8:  Trading halts on larger stocks should have narrower spreads and lower volatility in 
the immediate post-halt trading period.  
 
Wu (1998) provides evidence that market reactions are sensitive to the announced reason for 
the trading halt. Returns and volatility change substantially around mergers, acquisitions and 
private placement suspensions, but do not show significant changes around privatisation 
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halts. This suggests that the nature of halt news may be a factor in explaining the market 
behaviour around trading halts. Kim and Verrecchia (1991) also suggest that different 
trading halt announcement types may generate significant variations in trading volume and 
volatility. Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995) examine whether the amount of information 
released during a trading halts effects trading behaviour. Their results indicate that trading 
halts have no significant impact on the market around less-informative releases and conclude 
that trading halts lead to abnormal22 levels of volatility and bid-ask spreads around 
informative announcements. These views lead to the following hypotheses: 
 
H9:  Trading halts for informative new announcements result in abnormal volatility and 
bid-ask spreads.    
 
H10:  Trading halts for less informative new announcements do not result in abnormal 
volatility and bid-ask spreads.    
4.5.  Volatility and Order depth 
Corwin and Lipson (2000) find evidence that suggests increases in volatility are related to 
decreases in order depth in the post-halt period. However, they find that the decreased order 
depth appears to explain, at best, a small portion of the increased volatility. The remaining 
unexplained volatility may be the result of unmeasured information effects or due to the 
market closure itself. To investigate this further, the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
H11:  Abnormal volatility around trading halts is a result of decreased order depth in the 
limit order book.  
                                                 
22
  Abnormal statistics are calculated using the measure around the trading halt, less the measure during the 
control period. See Section 5.2.2 for further details. 
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5. DATA AND METHOD 
5.1.  Data 
The data for trading halts used in this study is provided by the Australian Stock Exchange 
ASX). The dataset consists of 18,505 trading halts, which were placed on ASX listed stocks 
between 1 January, 2005 and 26 September, 2006. The trading behaviour of stocks around 
their trading halts are compared to those for a set of control stocks (i.e. pseudo-halt stocks), 
which are identified by a strict set of selection criteria (see Section 5.2). Control stocks are 
obtained between 20 August, 2004 and 19 September, 2006. Trading halts are identified by 
the ASX Signal G database, which provides information on the start date and time and the 
end date and time for each trading halt. Additionally, the reason for each trading halt is also 
shown. Trading data for ASX stocks are extracted from the Stock Exchange Automated 
Trading System (SEATS) databases maintained by the Securities Industry Research Centre 
of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).23 The SEATS database provides complete details of all order and 
trade records placed on the ASX. These records provide details of price, volume, date, time 
and broker for every order and trade. The All Ordinaries Index is obtained to control for the 
impact of market-wide effects on returns for the sample. 
 
Sample selection criteria are applied to obtain the necessary full sample of trading halts, 
which are then used to analyse their impact on the trading behaviour of ASX listed stocks. 
Excluded from the final dataset are:  
• ASX stocks that underwent a change in the basis of quotation during the event 
period. This avoids any price changes that are not associated with the news 
announcement of the trading halt.  
                                                 
23
  SEATS is a competitive and open, electronic order book which trades continuously (from 10:00 to 16:00) 
from Monday to Friday. It allows brokers to clearly see bids and offers, place buy or sell orders, execute 
transactions, communicate with other brokers, and report any off-market transactions. 
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• ASX stocks that are placed into trading suspensions. This criterion is used because 
the effect of trading suspensions on stock behaviour is found to be notably different 
than for trading halts [Ferris, Kumar and Wolfe (1992)].  
 
• Trading halts on securities preceding de-listings or transfers to other exchanges and 
trading halts representing the first transaction of a new listing. This criterion is used 
to ensure trading halts have trading data available for 20 hours on either side of the 
trading halt, since this is the event interval analysed (see Section 5.3). 
 
• Trading halts on the same company that are applied more than once in the event 
interval. This criterion is used to prevent sample selection bias. 
 
These exclusions produce a full sample of 18,245 trading halts for analysis. 
5.2.   Research Method 
Several steps are undertaken in this study to examine the impact of trading halts on the 
trading behaviour of ASX listed stocks. First, trading halts are separated into various 
categories for analysis. Second, a procedure is adopted to identify control stocks (i.e. pseudo 
halts), which are needed to analyse for abnormal trading behaviour around trading halts. 
Third, intra-day-analysis is performed on several market quality variables to compare the 
trading behaviour between halted stocks and control stocks. Finally, supplemental analyses 
are performed including regression analysis to determine the relationships between market 
quality variables immediately after a trading halt.  
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5.2.1. Trading Halt Analysis 
For a more detailed analysis of stocks placed in trading halts on the ASX, they are 
categorised by their trading halt duration, market capitalisation, price change during the 
trading halt interval, and announcement type. These four categories are: 
[1]  Trading halt duration is defined as the length of the trading halt in minutes and is 
divided into the following four groups: (i) less than 15 minutes (< 15 min); (ii) 15 to 30 
minutes (15-30 mins); (iii) 30 to 60 minutes (30-60 mins); and (iv) more than 60 
minutes (> 60 mins). 
 
[2]  Market capitalisation is a proxy for firm size. Halted stocks are divided into three 
market capitalisation groups: (i) the largest 50 stocks (top 50), where these stocks 
represent the most liquid with extensive analyst coverage; (ii) the next 150 stocks (51-
200) are defined to be medium in size; and (iii) the remaining stocks outside the top 
200 (>200), which represent small stocks (i.e., less liquid) with minor stock analyst 
coverage. 
 
[3]  Price change during the trading halt is defined by the halted stock return adjusted for 
the market return as proxied by the All Ordinaries Index.24 This measure (hereafter 
termed the market-adjusted halt return) provides an indication for the amount of 
information content revealed during the trading halt interval.25 Informative trading 
halts are defined by either a positive (‘good news’) or negative (‘bad news’) market-
                                                 
24
 The stock return over the halt is computed using the mid-point price (i.e. mid-point of the bid-ask spread) 
immediately before the halt and the first traded price immediately after the halt. If no trade occurs then the 
mid-point price immediately after re-open is used. This computational procedure mitigates against bid-ask 
bounce in intra-day returns and recognises the problems of thin trading in less liquid stocks.  
25
  This technique is identical to that used by Bildik (2004), who find that it produces very similar results to the 
tick test of Lee and Ready (1991). 
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adjusted halt return. Conversely, less informative halts (‘no news’) are defined by a 
zero market-adjusted halt return.  
 
[4]  Trading halt announcement type describes the reason as to why an ASX listed stock 
was placed in a trading halt. This descriptor is obtained from the ASX Signal G 
database, which categorises the reason for the trading halt using specific primary and 
secondary codes (see Appendix). There are nineteen trading halt announcement types 
contained in the primary code. This study condenses the trading halt descriptor into a 
smaller subset of seven trading halt announcement types based on similar 
characteristics (see Appendix) for more meaningful analysis.  
5.2.2. Identification Procedure for Control stocks 
To investigate for abnormal trading behaviour around trading halts, a procedure to identify 
control stocks that exhibit ‘normal’ trading behaviour is required. Lee, Ready and Seguin 
(1994) highlight that an ideal experiment to achieve this task is to compare two identical 
firms, which experience the same market sensitive news announcement, where only one of 
those firms is placed into a trading halt. Though this ideal experiment is not achievable, this 
study adopts a procedure to identify control stocks towards this end. Developing an 
identification procedure for control stocks begins with an understanding of the main factors 
that influence the trading behaviour of stocks placed in a trading halt. Three broad factors 
that have been described to influence the trading behaviour of halted stocks include: 
 
[1] Time: It is a well stylised fact that the trading behaviour of equities can be dependant 
on the time-of-day and/or day-of-week. For example, the existence of U-shaped intra-
day volume, spread and volatility patterns (characterised by high values at the open 
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and close, compared to other periods within the day) has been reported consistently in 
the United States and a number of other overseas stock exchanges.26 
 
[2]  Information content: The intensity of the information content contained in the 
announcement accompanying the trading halt is likely to influence stock trading 
behaviour [see Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994);Brown, Clinch and Foster (1992)]; and  
 
[3]  Trading halt mechanism: The trading halt and procedure used to re-open trading 
may is likely to have an impact on stock trading behaviour [see Gerety and Mulherin 
(1992) and Lee Ready and Seguin (1994)] 
 
Controlling for the first two factors allow for the isolation and appropriate examination of 
the trading halt mechanism and its impact on the trading behaviour of halted stocks. To make 
the necessary adjustments, a three step identification procedure for control stocks is applied 
as follows: 
Step 1:   An absolute market-adjusted halt return27 for each ASX trading halt is computed.  
 
Step 2:   For each ASX halted stock, a historical series of control intervals (i.e. pseudo-halt 
intervals) matched by time-of-day and day-of-week of the actual halt is sampled. 
The control intervals identified are bounded within the control period, which 
                                                 
26
  Intra-day patterns in trading volume, spreads and volatility have been found to exhibit time dependent 
behaviour for most major stock markets around the world. These include the New York Stock Exchange 
[see McInish and Wood (1992)], Hong Kong Stock Exchange [see Brockman and Chung (1998)] and 
Australian Stock Exchange [see Aitken, Brown and Walter (1994)]. 
27
  Absolute market-adjusted halt return is computed as the absolute value of the halt return minus the return on 
the market index (All Ordinaries index). 
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extends from 140 to 14 days before the actual halt.28 Absolute market-adjusted 
returns for all control intervals are estimated.  
 
Step 3:  A matching algorithm is used to sequentially compare the absolute market-
adjusted halt return of each actual halted stock to the return in the nearest control 
interval. The interval in the control period with the closest market-adjusted 
absolute return to that found across the actual halt, is chosen as the control stock.  
  
The identification procedure for control stocks can be enhanced by specifying a low 
percentage for the abnormal absolute market-adjusted halt return (see Step 3). A 
shortcoming of doing so is that not all traded halts will be matched with control stocks, but 
on the upside this should allow for a better analysis of the extent of abnormal trading 
behaviour around trading halts. Consequently, this study not only examines the full sample 
of 18,245 trading halts, but does so for a more refined pseudo-halt sample of 16,113 trading 
halts. This pseudo-halt sample is obtained by setting the abnormal market-adjusted absolute 
return to 1 percent, in order for relevant control stocks to be selected.   
5.2.3. Intra-day Analysis of Trading Behaviour around Trading Halts  
The interval in which an ASX stock is placed in a trading halt (the ‘event’) is defined as t=0. 
An event window of eighty 15 minute intervals before (i.e., pre-halt period) and after the 
event (i.e., post-halt period) is used to analyse for abnormal trading behaviour of halted 
stocks.29 This allows for an examination of 20 hours of trading data on either side of the 
trading halt, which should provide sufficient time to detect if any abnormal trading 
                                                 
28
  Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) pseudo-halts could come from the second trading day in the post-halt period 
so that the events underlying the trading halts might affect the post pseudo-halt volatility. This study 
ensures that pseudo-halts are not within 14 days of the actual halt. 
29
  The opening and closing call auction periods are omitted from the intra-day intervals. This avoids any 
confounding effects from the call auction. If an interval begins within 15 minutes of the closing call auction, 
then the interval will end the following trading day after the opening call auction. 
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behaviour exists. Previous studies use daily or half hour intervals, with the only exception 
being Bildik (2004), who examines eighty 15-minute intervals. Shorter intervals allow for a 
more detailed analysis of abnormal trading behaviour around trading halts, which might be 
lessened through aggregation over longer interval lengths.  
 
Abnormal trading behaviour for several market quality variables (see Section 5.3) are 
analysed on an intra-day basis. For each halted stock analysed, an abnormal market quality 
variable measure is calculated. This measure is computed for each intra-day interval, by 
subtracting the market quality variable of interest in the control stock from that of the actual 
halted stock. The mean for each particular abnormal market quality variable is then 
calculated for each of the four 15-minute intervals surrounding a trading halt and for several 
event windows ranging from 20, 40 and 80 intervals on either side of the trading halt. The 
significance of each abnormal market quality variable is tested using a one-tailed Wilcoxon 
signed rank test. This test uses the rank and value of observations and avoids the 
assumptions of standard t-tests with only a small loss in efficiency. 
5.3.   Market Quality Variables used in the Analysis 
To examine the impact of trading halts, data for three main statistics of market quality are 
obtained. Market quality has many characteristics including liquidity, volatility and 
informative prices. This study uses similar measures to Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994), as 
well as Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995), which will allow for a direct comparison. 
5.3.1. Liquidity Measures 
5.3.1.1. Trading Volume 
Total dollar value of trades, total volume of shares traded and total number of trades in each 
interval is computed. Each of these measures provide similar results so only total volume of 
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shares traded in each time interval is presented. The re-opening auction volume is also 
calculated and represents the volume traded during the opening call auction following the 
end of a trading halt. Relative trading volume is also computed by dividing the trading 
volume for each firm by the total number of securities outstanding for that trading day. This 
measure is superior to other raw trading measures because it adjusts for market capitalisation 
changes.  
5.3.1.2. Bid-ask Spreads 
The difference between the lowest ask and the highest bid defines the bid-ask spread. Bid-
ask spreads tend to vary with the price of a stock and are often subject to arbitrary minimum 
tick size rules. Consequently, following McInish and Wood’s (1992) study, a time-weighted 
relative measure is calculated. That is, each spread is weighted by the amount of time it 
existed and divided by the time-weighted midpoint price.  
5.3.1.3. Order Depth 
Order depth is measured by summing the total volume of all orders in the limit order book at 
the start of each interval. Four measures different measures of order depth are calculated. 
Relative best bid (ask) order depth is computed as volume at the best quote on the buy (sell) 
side of the market. Relative total bid (ask)-side order depth, computed as the total volume on 
the buy (sell) side of the market. Relative order depth measures are computed by dividing the 
depth measure for each firm by the total number of securities outstanding for that trading 
day. This measure is superior to other raw trading measures because it adjusts for market 
capitalisation changes. 
5.3.2. Volatility Measures 
Trading halts are designed to minimise excessive volatility, therefore the impact of trading 
halts on stock return volatility is examined. Volatility is measured by ABSRET, computed as 
the absolute value of the difference between the last midpoint price before the interval and 
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the last midpoint price in the interval. ABSRET is a traditional measure of volatility and is 
believed to be a better estimator than squared returns (Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994)). 
ABSRET will capture the degree to which news around halts causes excess volatility 
regardless of the nature of the information.  The use of quote midpoints avoids bid-ask 
bounce, which imparts an upward bias in price volatility estimates based on trade prices (see 
Venkatesh (1992)). 
5.3.3. Return Measures 
To examine the return behaviour around trading halts, abnormal returns are computed for 
each interval around the trading halt. A key issue in an event study is how to measure 
‘abnormal’ returns. Engelen and Kabir (2006) use five different models to estimate abnormal 
returns and find that a simple market-adjusted model works as well as more complex 
models. Brown and Warner (1980) confirm that the simple models can work as well if not 
better than the complex models. Therefore abnormal returns are computed as the return on 
the halted stock, adjusted for the return on the market index (All Ordinaries Index). 
Abnormal returns are computed for 80 intervals either side of each trading halt. The 
abnormal returns for each trading halt are then cumulated from interval -80, to interval 80. 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR’s) for each trading halt are then averaged to provide 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR’s) in each interval.  
5.4.  Supplementary Analyses 
5.4.1. Volatility and Order Depth 
To investigate the relationship between volatility and order depth, this study uses a similar 
methodology to Corwin and Lipson (2000). Firstly abnormal volatility and abnormal order 
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depth at the best quotes30 are plotted against each other for the first 45-minutes after a 
trading halt. This will provide some indication of the relationship between volatility and 
order depth immediately after a trading halt. To further investigate this relationship, controls 
for abnormal volume, halt duration and market capitalisation are needed31. To control for 
these effects, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of abnormal volatility on abnormal 
depth and the control variables is estimated. The regressions are estimated for period 1 (15 
minutes after a trading halt) to give an indication of the relationship immediately after a 
trading halt. The regressions take the following general form: 
 
2
3
0 1
                                                       4  .
    *   *  
 *  *  
i i i
i i i
Abnormal Volatility a a AbnDepth a AbnVolume
a MktCap a HaltDuration ε
= + +
+ + +
 
 
The dependent variable is abnormal ABSRET32 and is used as the measure of abnormal 
volatility. The explanatory variables include the abnormal volume during interval 1 
(AbnVolume), abnormal depth at the best quotes (AbnDepth) at the start of interval 133, 
market capitalisation of halted stock (MktCap) and the duration of the trading halt in minutes 
(HaltDuration). The intercept from the regression can be interpreted as the average level of 
abnormal volatility that cannot be explained by the control variables.  
 
Corwin and Lipson (2000) estimate their regression controlling for the return during the 
trading halt, but do not control for market capitalisation and halt duration. This study already 
controls for trading halt return using the pseudo-halt methodology which Corwin and Lipson 
                                                 
30
  Corwin and Lipson (2000) use abnormal limit order depth within $0.25 of the best quotes.  
31
  See Section 4.5 for discussion of theory related to the possible impact of these variables. 
32
  Abnormal ABSRET is the ABSRET measure during the trading halt less the ABSRET measure during the 
corresponding pseudo-halt. ABSRET is defined in Section 5.4.2. 
33
  Abnormal depth at the best quotes is equal to the depth at the best bid, plus the depth at the best offer. 
Relative depth is not used because changes in market capitalisation is a controlled for in the regression. 
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(2000) do not use. Market capitalisation and halt duration, as discussed in Section 4.4, are 
expected to impact on the trading behaviour around trading halts. At the same time as well as 
examining the relationship between volatility and liquidity, the regression allows a further 
examination of the relationship between volume and volatility, as well as the impact of 
market capitalisation and trading halt duration on abnormal volatility.   
 
5.4.2. Alternative Matching Procedure 
Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) highlight that a bias may occur if the matching pseudo-halts 
have, on average, lower absolute price moves than the true halts. The requirement of a 1% 
match mitigates this problem, but the bias may still exist. To alleviate this possibility, they 
created an "overmatched" sample where every halt was matched against the pseudo-halt with 
the closest absolute net-of-market return greater than the absolute net-of-market halt return. 
They find similar results using the overmatched sample. To ensure that the results in thus 
study are not prone to the same possible bias, a sample is created were trading halts are 
matched within 0.05%. This effectively ensures that each trading halt is matched with a 
pseudo-halt of almost identical returns. 
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6. RESULTS 
6.1. Descriptive Statistics for Trading Halts 
6.1.1. Full Sample 
Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample of 18,245 trading halts (Panel A). 
Statistics include the total number of trading halts, the mean and medians for the length of 
the trading halt in minutes (i.e. trading halt duration), and those for the market-adjusted 
returns and absolute market-adjusted returns realised across the trading halt period. Trading 
halts are also examined by duration (Panel B), market capitalisation (Panel C), price change 
during the halt period (Panel D), and announcement type (Panel E).  
 
 
On examination of the full sample of trading halts (see Panel A of Table 6.1), the mean 
(median) trading halt duration is 39.41 (12.37) minutes. This large difference can be 
explained by outliers attributed to long term trading halts that usually last up to 2 trading 
days. Market-adjusted returns across the trading halt period are positive with the mean 
(medians) in the magnitude of 0.99% (0.21%). This suggests that trading halts in the sample 
period are associated with good news announcements. The mean (median) absolute market-
adjusted return of 2.31% (0.95%) is four times smaller to those documented by Lee, Ready 
and Seguin (1994) for their sample of trading halts on the NYSE34. This suggests that trading 
halts on NYSE stocks are only used during periods of higher volatility, relative to those on 
the ASX.  Under this premise, trading halts are used less often by exchange officials on the 
NYSE than on the ASX and is consistent with the relative number of trading halts used by 
these stock exchanges (see Table 2.1). 
 
                                                 
34
  Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) find that their sample of trading halts on the NYSE have a mean (median) 
absolute market-adjusted return of 8.1% (4.2%). 
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Table 6.1, Panel B reports that the majority (86%) of trading halts have durations of less than 
15 minutes. The bulk of the remaining trading halts have durations between 15 and 30 
minutes, with 10% of the sample falling within this category. The number of trading halts 
with durations between 30 and 60 minutes are the most infrequent. The mean and median 
market-adjusted absolute returns across the halt period are found to be higher for trading 
halts with longer durations. Trading halts over one hour have a mean of 8.31% compared to 
1.97% for halts of less than 15 minutes.   
 
In Panel C of Table 6.1, trading halts are examined within three market capitalisation groups. 
Across all market capitalisation groups, the median halt duration is similar, with each 
approximately 12 minutes. It is noted that there is a difference in the mean duration, for 
smallest stocks the mean is 40.96 minutes compared to 24.13 for the largest stocks. This 
suggests that smaller stocks are halted for longer periods than larger stocks. The mean and 
median market-adjusted returns (both actual and absolute) are found to decrease with firm 
size. This could be expected as the smallest stocks have longer average durations, which tend 
to produce higher halt returns. 
 
Table 6.1, Panel D classifies each trading halt by the sign of the price change during the 
trading halt duration period. A positive (negative) price change is associated with ‘good 
news’ (‘bad news’), where a zero price change represents a ‘no news’ event. In the sample 
period, 53% (31%) of trading halts are associated with ‘good news’ (‘bad news’). ‘No news’ 
trading halts (16%) have a shorter average trading halt duration (i.e., 18 minutes) than for 
trading halts with ‘good news’ (i.e., 45.40 minutes) or ‘bad news’ (i.e., 39.80 minutes). An 
explanation for this observation is that trading halts with longer (shorter) durations provide 
market participants with more (less) time to appropriately disseminate. 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample 
This Table provides descriptive statistics for the full sample of ASX trading halts examined between 1 January 2005 and 25 September 2006. Mean (Median) statistics are 
provided for trading halt duration and both actual and absolute market-adjusted returns for the trading halt duration. Market-adjusted returns are calculated as the return during the 
trading halt less the return on the All ordinaries index during the same period. Trading halts are also reported by trading halt duration, market capitalisation of halted stock, price 
change during the trading halt and announcement type. 
 
Number of Trading 
Halts in Sample       
(% of total) 
Trading Halt Duration   
( in minutes) Mean 
(Median) 
Market-adjusted 
Return Mean 
(Median) % 
Market-adjusted 
Absolute Return 
Mean (Median) % 
Panel A: Full sample 
Full Sample 18,245 (100%) 39.41 (12.37) 0.99% (0.21%) 2.31% (0.95%) 
Panel B: Full sample: Trading Halt Duration 
Less than 15 minutes 15,713 (86%) 12.09 (12.15) 0.82% (0.19%) 1.97% (0.88%) 
15-30 minutes 1,806 (10%) 17.86 (16.75) 0.89% (0.24%) 3.06% (1.23%) 
30-60 minutes 103 (1%) 41.60 (39.18) 0.54% (-0.16%) 6.81% (2.77%) 
Longer than 60 minutes 623 (3%) 790.59 (207.88) 5.97% (1.87%) 8.31% (3.34%) 
Panel C: Full sample: Market Capitalisation 
Top 50 (Largest) 857 (5%) 24.13 (12.68) 0.03% (0.01%) 0.89% (0.16%) 
51-200 (Medium) 1,524 (10%) 44.31 (12.73) 0.22% (0.06%) 1.12% (0.31%) 
201+ (Smallest) 13,814 (85%) 40.96 (12.32) 1.09% (0.40%) 2.49% (1.13%) 
Panel D: Full sample: Price Change During Trading Halt 
‘Bad News’(Negative) 5,612 (31%) 39.80 (12.35) -2.24% (1.31%) 1.73% (0.76%) 
‘Good News’ (Positive) 9,734 (53%) 45.40 (12.46) 3.12% (1.64%) 2.81% (1.20%) 
‘No News’ (Zero) 2,897 (16%) 18.54 (12.10) 0.00% (0.00%) 1.76% (0.28%) 
Panel E: Full sample: Announcement Type 
Asset acquisition/ Disposal 1,259 (7%) 16.64 (12.77) 0.98% (0.21%) 2.01% (0.64%) 
ASX announcement/Query 737 (4%) 626.59 (88.37) 2.86% (0.42%) 5.60% (2.07%) 
Financial Information 3,769 (21%) 12.87 (12.00) 0.18% (0.02%) 1.69% (0.75%) 
Miscellaneous 1,834 (10%) 13.70 (11.88) 0.14% (0.01%) 1.80% (0.67%) 
Progress Report 8,654 (47%) 13.40 (12.43) 1.50% (0.79%) 2.40% (1.17%) 
Share issue 1,250 (7%) 15.81 (12.30) -0.44% (-0.01%) 2.16% (0.88%) 
Takeover related 742(4%) 36.18 (13.60) 1.91% (0.02%) 3.14% (0.48%) 
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market sensitive information into the stock price. Subsequently, it can be argued that trading 
halts with longer (shorter) durations will result in either positive or negative (zero) price 
changes.  
 
In Panel E of Table 6.1, trading halts are grouped by announcement type. The majority of 
trading halts (47%) are initiated immediately before the release of a progress report by the 
listed company. This is consistent with the need for ASX listed companies to comply with 
continuous disclosure regulations (see Section 2.3). The duration of trading halts are 
comparable across most announcement types, except for those classified by ASX 
announcement/query. These halts have a median duration of 88.37 minutes and are associated 
with the highest average market-adjusted (both actual and absolute) halt return. Conversely, 
trading halts used for the release of financial information and for miscellaneous reasons such 
as company administration have small average market-adjusted halt returns. The lack of 
significant positive returns during the halt period for these types of announcements are 
explained by (i) the lack of importance placed on the information being released to the 
market; and/or (ii) the fact that this information has already been impounded into the stock 
price before the trading halt used to provide for the “official” information release. The 
announcement to issue new capital by an ASX listed company is the only announcement type 
associated with a negative market-adjusted halt return. The mean market-adjusted halt return 
of -0.44% indicates a negative reaction to the issue of new capital. 
6.1.2. Matched Sample  
Table 6.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the pseudo-halt matched sample. Of the 18,245 
trading halts in the full sample, 88.31% are matched with pseudo-halts, resulting in a matched 
sample of 16,113 trading halts. This matched sample is larger  relative to Lee, Ready and 
Seguin (1994) who match 59% of their full sample using the same method. In Panel A of 
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Table 6.2, it can be observed that the pseudo-halt matched sample has similar trading halt 
durations and lower market-adjusted returns (both actual and absolute) compared to the full 
sample (see Panel A, Table 6.1).35 The results of these direct comparisons are consistent with 
a correct application of the pseudo-halt matching procedure. 
6.2. Liquidity Impacts  
6.2.1. Trading Volume 
6.2.1.1. Trading Volume: Full vs. Matched Sample 
Table 6.3 reports the abnormal trading volume and abnormal relative trading volume for both 
the full sample and the pseudo-halt matched sample. Each measure has been calculated for 80 
intervals either side of the trading halt as well as the average for 20, 40 and 80 intervals either 
side of the trading halt. Table 6.3 reports the average abnormal volume and abnormal relative 
volume for the event periods [-80,-1], [-40,-1], [-20,-1], -4, -3, -2, -1, 1, 2, 3, 4, [1, 20], [1, 
40] and [1, 80]. 
 
The full sample results in Table 6.3 show that both abnormal volume and relative volume are 
extremely high and significant in the post-halt period. Firstly, the re-opening volume is 
significantly higher (24,644) than the volume traded during the pseudo-halt. Immediately 
following the trading halt abnormal volume is 392,236 units in interval 1 (first 15 minutes 
following a trading halt). Following interval 1, abnormal trading volumes begin to decline 
while remaining significantly high. This is shown by the abnormal volume of 19,602 units in 
interval [1, 80] (the average abnormal volume in the 80 intervals following a trading halt).  
 
                                                 
35
 The mean market-adjusted return (market-adjusted absolute return) for the pseudo-halt matched sample is 
0.50% (1.30%) compared to 0.99% (2.31%) for the full sample. It is noted that this difference reflects the 
problem of finding suitable matches for trading halts that exhibit large price changes across the trading halt 
period. 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics for Matched Sample 
This Table provides descriptive statistics for the matched sample of ASX trading halts examined between 1 January 2005 and 25 September 2006 Mean (Median) statistics are 
provided for trading halt duration and both actual and absolute market-adjusted returns for the trading halt duration. Market-adjusted returns are calculated as the return during the 
trading halt less the return on the All ordinaries index during the same period. Trading halts are also reported by trading halt duration, market capitalisation of halted stock, price 
change during the trading halt and announcement type. 
 
Number of Trading 
Halts in Sample       
(% of total) 
Trading Halt Duration   
( in minutes) Mean 
(Median) 
Market-adjusted 
Return Mean 
(Median) % 
Market-adjusted 
Absolute Return 
Mean (Median) % 
Panel A: Matched sample 
Matched Sample 16,113 34.50 (12.32) 0.50% (0.13%) 1.30% (0.73%) 
Panel B: Matched sample: Trading Halt Duration 
Less than 15 minutes 14,094 (87.5%) 12.05 (12.13) 0.48% (0.13%) 1.23% (0.69%) 
15-30 minutes 15,209 (9.4%) 17.59 (16.54) 0.52% (0.15%) 1.46% (0.86%) 
30-60 minutes 71 (0.4%) 40.29 (37.13) -0.64% (-0.34%) 2.05% (1.28%) 
Longer than 60 minutes 428 (2.7%) 832.75 (240.59) 1.34% (0.53%) 2.77% (1.75%) 
Panel C: Matched sample: Market Capitalisation 
Top 50 (Largest) 816 (5%) 23.15 (12.65) 0.04% (0.01%) 0.45% (0.15%) 
51-200 (Medium) 1,411 (10%) 40.58 (12.67) 0.04% (0.06%) 0.60% (0.28%) 
201+ (Smallest) 12,143 (85%) 35.24 (12.28) 0.56% (0.24%) 1.42% (0.90%) 
Panel D: Matched sample: Price Change  
‘Bad News’(Negative) 5,155 (32%) 38.54 (12.32) -1.87% (-1.17%) 1.15% (0.64%) 
‘Good News’ (Positive) 8,265 (51%) 37.04 (12.40) 2.11% (1.35%) 1.43% (0.90%) 
‘No News’ (Zero) 2,691 (17%) 18.96 (12.12) 0.00% (0.00%) 1.15% (0.17%) 
Panel E: Matched sample: Announcement Type 
Asset acquisition/ Disposal 1,139 (7%) 16.70 (12.72) 0.56% (0.15%) 1.13% (0.50%) 
ASX announcement/Query 572 (4%) 584.92 (20.61) 0.80% (0.09%) 2.25% (1.33%) 
Financial Information 3,459 (21%) 12.85 (11.98) 0.06% (0.01%) 1.10% (0.63%) 
Miscellaneous 1,692 (11%) 13.71 (11.87) 0.07% (0.01%) 1.21% (0.52%) 
Progress Report 7,485 (46%) 13.32 (12.42) 0.93% (0.59%) 1.39% (0.89%) 
Share issue 1,126 (7%) 15.58 (12.23) -0.30% (0.00%) 1.33% (0.63%) 
Takeover related 640 (4%) 27.25 (13.10) 0.16% (-0.02%) 0.86% (0.35%) 
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Table 6.3 Abnormal Trading Volume: Full Vs Matched Sample 
This Table reports the average abnormal volume and relative volume behaviour around trading halts. Full 
represents the full sample and matched indicates the pseudo-halt matched sample. Re-opening represents the 
abnormal volume (relative) volume traded in the opening call auction after a trading halt less the volume 
(relative) volume traded over the same period in the pseudo-halt. Interval 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent fifteen-minute 
intervals immediately following a trading halt. Interval -1, -2, -3 and -4 represent fifteen-minute intervals 
immediately before a trading halt. Interval (1, 20) denotes the average measure during the period between 
interval 1 and 20 following a trading halt. Similarly, (-20, -1) refers to the period between interval -1 and 
interval -20 interval prior to a trading halt. Similarly for (-40, -1), (1, 40), (-80, -1) and (1, 80). *, **, *** 
denotes the statistical significance, at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively using Wilcoxon sign-
ranked tests. 
 
Abnormal Trading 
Volume 
Abnormal Relative 
Trading Volume (%) 
Interval Full Matched Full Matched 
[-80,-1] -270 359 -0.0005 0.0000 
[-40,-1] 2,060 2,747 0.0003 0.0007 
[-20-1] 3,741 4,672 0.0011 0.0017 
-4 1,303 3,780 0.0005 0.0013 
-3 5,46 6,023 -0.0002 0.0005 
-2 6,145 8,381 0.0009 0.0016 
-1 5,688 4,184 0.0017 0.0026 
Re-opening 24,644*** 5,918** 0.0102*** 0.0020*** 
1 392,236*** 239,433*** 0.1447*** 0.0822*** 
2 114,598*** 70,624*** 0.0430*** 0.0236*** 
3 67,922*** 40,166*** 0.0272*** 0.0151*** 
4 45,481*** 29,319*** 0.0197*** 0.0115*** 
[1,20] 52,566*** 31,396*** 0.0206*** 0.0107*** 
[1,40] 32,434*** 19,493*** 0.0123*** 0.0060*** 
[1, 80] 19,602*** 12,113*** 0.0074*** 0.0038*** 
 
The full sample results control for firm, time-of-day and day-of-week effects but do not 
control for the magnitude of the price move during the halt. Typically, a trading halt is 
associated with a major price move, so a portion of the post-halt volume may be attributable 
to liquidity trading and portfolio rebalancing activities made in reaction to changes in share 
value. Thus, these results for the full sample may not be surprising. The pseudo-halt matched 
sample overcomes this and isolates the abnormal trading volume attributable to the trading 
halt mechanism.  
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The matched sample in Table 6.3 reports similar results to the full sample, but of a smaller 
magnitude. The abnormal re-opening trading volume is still significantly high, but is now 
only 5,918 units compared to 24,644 units for the full sample. Similarly all of the post-event 
windows show the same results but of lesser magnitude. This reduction in abnormal trading 
volume reflects controlling for the amount of information being released. The presence of 
further abnormal trading volume is attributable to the impact of the trading halt itself. The 
results for relative volume show a similar result to the volume statistics and will not be 
discussed.   
 
In order to graphically examine the difference between the results of the full vs. matched 
sample, Figure 6.1 reports abnormal trading volumes for 80 intervals either side of the trading 
halt for the full and matched sample. Both exhibit a similar pattern in the pre-event intervals 
with no significant abnormal trading volume in the lead up to a trading halt. Immediately 
after the trading halt in interval 1, both samples increase dramatically and do not return to the 
pseudo-halt levels until interval 10 (150 minutes after a trading halt). Some positive abnormal 
trading behaviour still exists after interval 10 and persists for over 30 intervals. Taken 
together these results are consistent with similar studies such as Lee, Ready and Seguin 
(1994) and Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995) and also consistent with hypothesis 1.  
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Figure 6.1 Abnormal Trading Volume: Full Vs Matched Sample 
This Figure displays the average abnormal trading volume for the full and matched sample over the 
event period [-80, 80]. 
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6.2.1.2. Trading volume by Market capitalisation, Trading halt duration, Price 
change and Announcement type 
Table 6.4, reports the results separated by the market capitalisation of the halted stocks. 
Abnormal trading volume in interval [1, 20] is 233% higher for the largest 50 stocks (70,383 
units) compared to the smallest stocks (30,117 units) in the sample. This result is consistent 
across all post-halt event periods and suggests trading halts on larger stocks result in higher 
abnormal volume compared to smaller stocks in the post-halt period. Table 6.4 also presents 
the results separated by the duration of the trading halt. Trading halts of longer duration result 
in significantly larger and prolonged abnormal volumes. For example, the abnormal volume 
for halts of less than 15 minutes (<15) in interval [1, 80] is 10,287 units compared to 72,310 
units for trading halts over an hour (>60). This suggests that longer trading halts increase 
liquidity around trading halts, however it is vital that the excess trading volume does not 
result in excess volatility (to be examined in Section 6.3). 
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Table 6.4 Abnormal Trading Volume by Price Change, Market Capitalisation and Trading Halt Duration 
This Table reports the average abnormal volume behaviour around trading halts for the matched sample. Re-opening represents the abnormal volume traded in the opening call 
auction after a trading halt less the volume traded over the same period in the pseudo-halt. Interval 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately following a trading 
halt. Interval -1, -2, -3 and -4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately before a trading halt. Interval (1, 20) denotes the average measure during the period between interval 
1 and 20 following a trading halt. Similarly, (-20, -1) refers to the period between interval -1 and interval -20 interval prior to a trading halt. Similarly for (-40, -1), (1, 40), (-80, -
1) and (1, 80). Price change represents the price change during the trading halt. Market Capitalisation represents the market capitalisation of the halted stock. Halt duration is the 
length of the trading halt in minutes. For the abnormal measures, *, **, *** denotes the statistical significance, at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively using Wilcoxon 
sign-ranked tests 
Abnormal Volume by: 
 Price Change Market Capitalisation Halt Duration (Minutes) 
Interval ‘Bad News’ ‘Good News’ ‘No News’ Top 50 51-200 201+ <15 15-30 30-60 60+ 
[-80,-1] 1,578 -363 288*** 5,134 7,004* -773 -130 539 17,465 * 13,930** 
[-40,-1] 5,464* 2,124 -423*** -2,514* 11,713*** 2,494 2,530 -904 21,204 20,960*** 
[-20-1] 8,384** 4,245 -958*** -3,156* 16,956** 4,478 3,849 5,050 32,252 27,457*** 
-4 2,958 6,196* -2,066 6,776 10,834* 3,206 2,668 5,620 16,286 33,884 
-3 9,649 6,277 -1,527 6,026 26,057 4,739 4,402 3,950 21,929 68,204** 
-2 13,096 7,604 1,950 -9,120 51,368** 7,292 7,410 12,106 25,735* 25,558* 
-1 4,446 4,651 2,233 443 21,633 3,289 3,747 -860 -29,978 44,545** 
Re-opening -9,996*** 17,954*** -708*** -161,527*** -29,525*** 21,607*** 11,080*** 26,911** 13,443 -249,639*** 
1 223,332*** 311,811*** 48,057*** 430,502*** 217,072*** 249,006*** 205,425*** 333,843*** 564,204*** 1023,785*** 
2 82,595** 83,799*** 7,945 162,853*** 112,378*** 66,562*** 60,461*** 89,180*** 154,077*** 343,706*** 
3 44,389** 49,843*** 2,664 98,217*** 54,864*** 38,205*** 31,945*** 57,779*** 162,145*** 241,829*** 
4 48,401*** 29,896*** -8,099 84,903*** 42,409*** 27,245*** 22,181*** 46,827*** 131,785*** 196,687*** 
[1,20] 38,053*** 36,155*** 4,401** 70,383*** 40,293*** 30,117*** 26,221*** 41,823*** 77,874*** 166,119*** 
[1,40] 25,179*** 21,581*** 2,482 45,800*** 31,950*** 17,823*** 16,245*** 25,324*** 58,926*** 104,920*** 
[1, 80] 16,824*** 12,953*** 736 29,573*** 18,707*** 11,300*** 10,287*** 11,848*** 42,666*** 72,310*** 
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Table 6.4 further reports abnormal volume separated by the price change during the trading 
halt period. The abnormal volume increases most significantly for ‘good news’ halts in 
interval 1 (311,811), while remaining significantly high for ‘bad news’ (223,332) and ‘no 
news’ (48,057) trading halts. Trading halts associated with ‘good news’ or ‘bad news’, result 
in significantly abnormal volume for up to one trading day, whereas abnormal volume 
disappears within 1 hour for ‘no news’ halts. Abnormal trading volume still exists after ‘no 
news’ trading halts, but is lower suggesting the impact of trading halts is not as significant 
when the information being released is less informative.  
 
The presence of abnormal trading volume for up to an hour is of concern for ‘no news’ 
trading halts. If there is no price change during the trading halt, there should not be any 
abnormal trading behaviour caused by liquidity trading and portfolio-rebalancing activities 
made in reaction to changes in share value. This suggests that many trading halts are called 
for the release of information that does not have a material effect on the price of a security. 
The only impact is to impose an unnecessary restriction on trading that leads to abnormal 
trading volume after a trading halt.  
 
Table 6.5 reports abnormal trading volume results by the type of announcement being 
released during the trading halt. The results all show similar patterns with some stronger than 
others. As expected, trading halts grouped together as miscellaneous have the lowest 
abnormal trading volumes in the post-halt period. These announcements are not highly 
informative and do not result in large price changes.36 Despite the lack of information, they 
still result in significant and positive abnormal volumes. This is shown by the abnormal 
trading volume in interval [1, 20] of 20,326 units. The category with the highest abnormal  
                                                 
36
  Table 6.2 shows the average abnormal return during miscellaneous trading halts is 0.07%. The matched 
sample has an average abnormal return of 0.50%.  
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Table 6.5 Abnormal Trading Volume by Announcement Type 
This Table reports the average abnormal volume behaviour around trading halts for the matched sample. Re-opening represents the abnormal volume traded in the opening call 
auction after a trading halt less the volume traded over the same period in the pseudo-halt. Interval 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately following a trading 
halt. Interval -1, -2, -3 and -4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately before a trading halt. Interval (1, 20) denotes the average measure during the period between interval 
1 and 20 following a trading halt. Similarly, (-20, -1) refers to the period between interval -1 and interval -20 interval prior to a trading halt. Similarly for (-40, -1), (1, 40), (-80, -
1) and (1, 80). Announcement Type represents categories formed based on the announcement made during each trading halt. For the abnormal measures, *, **, *** denotes the 
statistical significance, at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively using Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests 
Announcement Type 
Interval 
Asset 
Acquisition/ 
Disposal 
ASX 
Announcement/Query 
Financial 
Information Miscellaneous Progress Report Share Issue 
Takeover 
Related 
[-80,-1] 1,586 37,752*** -5,294** -1,622 -319 7,095 -3,136 
[-40,-1] 148 58,049*** -1,156 -1,603 1,810 5,340** -2,868 
[-20-1] 7,624 75,308*** -184 1,503 1,812 5,096** 3,986 
-4 27,788** 43,260*** -5,969* 6,722 950 9,945 -6,601 
-3 17,163 68,258*** -47 -2,636 4,352 8,816 1,292 
-2 455 53,716*** -4,158 31,096 6,931 3,733 14,778 
-1 -13,083 50,794*** -3,072 22,538 4,794 -11,152** 3,293 
Re-opening 6,316 -97,986 -2,089** -2,108*** 16,901*** 34,531 -15,770*** 
1 305,974*** 638,923*** 101,164*** 100,848*** 277,136*** 339,258*** 262,813*** 
2 88,512*** 230,387*** 39,118*** 25,511*** 75,625*** 64,046*** 139,487*** 
3 52,144*** 170,518*** 26,569*** 13,970*** 36,679*** 56,018*** 59,047*** 
4 39,863*** 154,330*** 24,834*** 7,204*** 23,986*** 30,713*** 42,290*** 
[1,20] 43,839*** 129,562*** 16,296*** 20,326*** 28,846*** 40,037*** 47,772*** 
[1,40] 29,312*** 92,531*** 12,230*** 10,063*** 15,873*** 25,987*** 32,508*** 
[1, 80] 16,170*** 60,502*** 8,395*** 5,424*** 9,310*** 21,727*** 15,915*** 
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trading volume over the same period is halts called for an ASX announcement or query. 
Trading halts of this type have a longer average duration (584.92 minutes) compared the 
matched sample (34.50 minutes) and all other halts categories (see Table 6.2). Table 6.2 
demonstrates that longer trading halts tend to result in larger abnormal volumes.37  
6.2.2. Bid-ask Spreads 
6.2.2.1.  Relative Bid-ask Spreads: Full and Matched Sample 
Table 6.6 presents the abnormal relative bid-ask spreads results for both the full and matched 
sample. Interval -1 (-0.0031%) and interval [-20, 1] (0.0359%) indicate that the abnormal 
relative bid-ask spreads are not significantly different from zero, for the matched sample, in 
the pre-halt period. The post-halt intervals display a different pattern with significantly wider 
abnormal relative bid-ask spreads in interval 1 (0.1203%). The abnormal relative bid-ask 
spreads have more than tripled from the pre-halt period and remain abnormally wide in 
interval 2, 3 and 4.  The abnormal relative bid-ask spread in interval [1, 20] (0.0112%), 
suggests that abnormal relative bid-ask spreads begin to narrow in the post-halt period. 
 
Figure 6.2 shows that abnormal relative bid-ask spreads are widest immediately following a 
trading halt and remain abnormally wider for 11 intervals, (2 hours and 45 minutes) before 
becoming abnormally narrow over the remaining intervals. This is shown in Table 6.6 by the 
significantly narrow abnormal relative bid-ask spreads in interval [1, 80] (-0.0739%). This 
suggests that trading halts in the long term reduce bid-asks spreads, but impose higher 
transaction costs through bid-ask spreads immediately after a trading halt. This is consistent 
with hypothesis 2.  
                                                 
37
 Table 6.2 shows the average abnormal return during trading halts longer than 60 minutes is 1.34% compared 
to 0.48% for halts of less than 15 minutes. 
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Table 6.6 Abnormal Relative Bid-ask Spreads: Full Vs Matched Sample 
This Table shows the average abnormal relative bid-ask spread behaviour around trading halts. Full represents 
the full sample and matched indicates the pseudo-halt matched sample. Interval 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent fifteen-
minute intervals immediately following a trading halt. Interval -1, -2, -3 and -4 represent fifteen-minute intervals 
immediately before a trading halt. Interval (1, 20) denotes the average measure during the period between 
interval 1 and 20 following a trading halt. Similarly, (-20, -1) refers to the period between interval -1 and 
interval -20 interval prior to a trading halt. Similarly for (-40, -1), (1, 40), (-80, -1) and (1, 80). For the abnormal 
measures, *, **, *** denotes the statistical significance, at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively 
using Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests. 
Abnormal Relative Bid-ask Spreads (%) 
Interval Full Matched 
[-80,-1] -0.0017*** -0.0167*** 
[-40,-1] 0.0169*** 0.0070 
[-20-1] 0.0429 0.0359 
-4 0.0370 0.0333 
-3 0.0131*** 0.0121 
-2 -0.0031*** 0.0015 
-1 -0.0099*** -0.0031*** 
1 0.1348*** 0.1203*** 
2 0.1059* 0.1217*** 
3 0.1023* 0.1175*** 
4 0.0838* 0.0940** 
[1,20] -0.0253*** 0.0112* 
[1,40] -0.0773*** -0.0487*** 
[1, 80] -0.0934*** -0.0739*** 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Abnormal Relative Bid-ask Spread: Matched Sample 
This Figure displays the average abnormal relative bid-ask spreads for the matched sample over the  
event period [-80, 80]. 
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These results are similar to Corwin and Lipson (2000) who find that bid-ask spreads are 
abnormally wide around trading halts but narrow within 30 minutes for news-related trading 
halts. The results in Figure 6.2 suggest that the trading halt mechanism on the ASX may take 
longer to impound new information and trading halts result in longer and wider abnormal 
spreads than on the NYSE. Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995) also find that bid-ask spreads are 
abnormally wide immediately after a trading halt. Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995) show that 
abnormal bid-ask spreads persist for up to two days following trading halts on the ASX. In 
contrast the results in Figure 6.2, shows that abnormal relative bid-ask spreads narrow within 
3 hours after a trading halt. This suggests that the ASX has improved in its ability to release 
information, but still impose higher transaction costs through the use of trading halts.  
6.2.2.2. Relative Bid-ask Spreads by Price change, Market capitalisation and 
 Trading halt duration 
Table 6.7 and Figure 6.3 present the abnormal relative bid-ask spreads for the different price 
change categories. The abnormal relative bid-ask spreads are significantly wider before and 
after ‘no news’ trading halts. The abnormal relative bid-ask spreads are particularly wide for 
‘no news’ halts, in the pre-halt period as shown by interval [1, 20] (0.8219%) in Table 6.7. In 
Figure 6.3, abnormal relative bid-ask spreads begin to narrow following ‘no news’ trading 
halts, returning close to zero approximately a day after ‘no news’ trading halts. The 
abnormally wide spreads may be due to uncertainty in the market which, following a trading 
halt is resolved. Alternatively, it could suggest that trading halts impose unreasonably wider 
bid-ask spreads in situations were no significant news is announced. This is inconsistent with 
hypothesis 10. 
  
In contrast to ‘no news’ trading halts, ‘bad news’ and ‘good news’ trading halts provide 
different results. Abnormal relative bid-ask spreads for ‘bad news’ trading halts, in Figure 
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6.3, are close to zero leading up to a trading halt, abnormally wide immediately after a 
trading halt, before gradually narrowing in the following days. The trading halt appears to 
impose wider relative bid-ask spreads for ‘bad news’ trading halts then what would have 
occurred if no trading halt were called. The results for the ‘good news’ halts are in contrast 
with abnormally narrow relative bid-ask spreads in the lead up to a trading halt, followed by 
narrower spreads after a trading halt. This suggests trading halts are more effective in 
reducing uncertainty around positive news announcements. 
 
Figure 6.3 Abnormal Relative Bid-ask Spread by Price Change 
This Figure displays the average abnormal relative bid-ask spreads for the matched sample over the event period   
[-80, 80]. Results are separated by the price change during the trading halt. 
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Table 6.7 Abnormal Relative Bid-ask Spreads by Price change, Market Capitalisation and Trading Halt Duration 
This Table shows the average abnormal relative bid-ask spread behaviour around trading halts for the matched sample. Interval 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent fifteen-minute intervals 
immediately following a trading halt. Interval -1, -2, -3 and -4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately before a trading halt. Interval (1, 20) denotes the average measure 
during the period between interval 1 and 20 following a trading halt. Similarly, (-20, -1) refers to the period between interval -1 and interval -20 interval prior to a trading halt. 
Similarly for (-40, -1), (1, 40), (-80, -1) and (1, 80). For the abnormal measures, *, **, *** denotes the statistical significance, at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively 
using Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests. Price change represents the price change during the trading halt. Market Capitalisation represents the market capitalisation of the halted stock. 
Halt duration is the length of the trading halt in minutes. 
Abnormal Relative Bid-ask Spreads % by: 
Category Price Change Market Capitalisation Halt Duration (Minutes) 
Interval ‘Bad News’ 
‘Good 
News’ ‘No News’ Top 50 51-200 201+ <15 15-30 30-60 60+ 
[-80,-1] -0.0626 -0.1795*** 0.5665*** 0.0127 -0.0182*** -0.0680*** -0.0109*** -0.0052 -0.1508* -0.2420*** 
[-40,-1] -0.0502* -0.1819*** 0.6915*** 0.0079* -0.0125** -0.0349 0.0204 -0.0580 0.0042 -0.2228*** 
[-20-1] -0.0393* -0.1750*** 0.8219*** 0.0001* -0.0058* 0.0041 0.0523 -0.0598 -0.0461 -0.1689** 
-4 -0.0409 -0.2032*** 0.8947*** 0.0007 0.0176* 0.0142 0.0472 -0.0463 0.3741 -0.2208 
-3 -0.0645 -0.2283*** 0.8890*** -0.0012 0.0192 -0.0063 0.0211 -0.0438 0.2116 -0.1323* 
-2 -0.0648 -0.2596*** 0.9233*** 0.0064 -0.003** -0.0219 0.0135 -0.0810 0.4730* -0.1898 
-1 -0.0450 -0.3041*** 0.9995*** 0.0045 -0.0011 -0.0294*** 0.0123 -0.1172 0.2750 -0.1802* 
1 0.1396*** -0.1418** 0.8923*** 0.0365*** 0.0334*** 0.1049*** 0.1308*** 0.0063* -0.5305* 0.2952*** 
2 0.1973*** -0.1220*** 0.7317*** 0.0287** 0.0334* 0.1080** 0.1338*** -0.0046* -0.3935* 0.2625* 
3 0.1748*** -0.0964** 0.6703*** 0.0309*** 0.0162* 0.1102*** 0.1286*** 0.0206* -0.6201* 0.2207* 
4 0.1679*** -0.1197*** 0.6118*** 0.0267* 0.0093* 0.0761* 0.1109*** -0.0309* -0.4803* 0.0709* 
[1,20] 0.1663*** -0.2379*** 0.4800*** 0.0249* -0.0125* -0.0332* 0.0382* -0.2014** -0.6049* -0.0314* 
[1,40] 0.1511*** -0.3093*** 0.3722 0.0153* -0.0198*** -0.0976*** -0.0181*** -0.2457*** -0.7625*** -0.2604** 
[1, 80] 0.0950* -0.3037*** 0.3129 0.0112* -0.0069*** -0.1288*** -0.0413*** -0.2493*** -0.8862*** -0.4217*** 
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Figure 6.4 and Table 6.7 illustrate a significant difference between the abnormal relative bid-
ask spreads for different sized stocks. Immediately following a trading halt, abnormal relative 
bid-ask spreads are widest for smaller stocks. The abnormal relative bid-ask spreads in 
interval 1 are 270% wider for the smallest category (0.1049%) compared to the largest 
category (0.0365%). This is consistent with hypothesis 8. Figure 6.4 further illustrates that 
the abnormal relative bid-ask spreads for smaller stocks, in the post-halt period, begin to 
narrow and become abnormally narrow after interval 8. This suggests that trading halts in due 
course are effective in reducing the large amounts of uncertainty present for smaller stocks. 
For larger stocks, there is no abnormal relative bid-ask spreads in the pre-halt period, this is 
followed by abnormally wide relative bid-ask spreads in the post-halt period until interval 25. 
This suggests that trading halts seem to place an unnecessary impediment for larger stocks 
were less uncertainty is present.  
Figure 6.4 Abnormal Relative Bid-ask Spread by Market Capitalisation 
This Figure displays the average abnormal relative bid-ask spreads for the matched sample over the event period 
[-80, 80]. Results are separated by market capitalisation. 
-0.0025
-0.002
-0.0015
-0.001
-0.0005
0
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
-
80
-
75
-
70
-
65
-
60
-
55
-
50
-
45
-
40
-
35
-
30
-
25
-
20
-
15
-
10 -5 Ha
lt 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Event Interval
A
bn
o
rm
al
 
R
e
la
tiv
e
 
B
id
-
a
sk
 
Sp
re
a
d 
(%
)
51-200 (medium)
201+(Smallest)
Top 50(Largest)
 
 74 
Table 6.7 and Figure 6.5 highlight that the duration of a trading halt may affect abnormal 
relative bid-ask spreads. Trading halts of less than 15 minutes make up the majority (87.5%) 
of the matched sample and consequently provide similar results to the matched sample. 
Trading halts of between 15-30 minutes appear to more effective than those less than 15 
minutes. The abnormal relative bid-ask spreads (15-30 minutes) are not significantly wide 
immediately following a trading halt, before becoming abnormally narrow after only an hour. 
Trading halts between 30-60 minutes exhibit the greatest variation of abnormal relative bid-
ask spreads around a trading halt. The relative bid-ask spreads are abnormally wide leading 
into a trading halt before becoming abnormally narrow in the post-halt period. Suggesting 
that trading halts (30-60 minutes), involve large amounts of uncertainty being resolved 
through the information revealed during a trading halt. Trading  halts with a duration over an 
hour result in abnormally narrow bid-ask spreads leading up to a trading halt and abnormally 
wide bid-ask spreads immediately after a trading halt. This result is consistent with 
hypothesis 7. 
Figure 6.5 Abnormal Relative Bid-ask Spread by Trading Halt Duration 
This Figure displays the average abnormal relative bid-ask spreads for the matched sample over the event period 
[-80, 80]. Results are separated by the trading halt duration (Minutes). 
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6.2.3. Order Depth 
6.2.3.1. Abnormal Order depth: Matched sample 
This section examines the impact of trading halts on order depth. Table 6.8 reports abnormal 
order depth for the matched sample, presented as relative order depth (percentage of the 
number of shares outstanding on the halted stock). The results are highly significant and 
indicate that abnormal best bid depth is significantly greater than zero in all intervals except 
interval 1 (-0.0106%). In contrast, abnormal best ask depth before the trading halt is not 
significantly different from zero, as shown by interval [-80,-1] (0.0010%). The post-event 
results are significant and illustrate that order depth at the best ask is significantly lower 
following a trading halt and remains low as shown by the abnormal depth at the best ask in 
interval [1, 20] (-0.0025%). This reduction likely reflects investors' reduced willingness to 
supply liquidity at these times. 
Table 6.8 Abnormal Order Depth: Matched Sample 
This Table shows the average abnormal order depth behaviour around trading halts for the matched sample. 
Order depth is represented by relative depth at the best bid (Best bid), relative depth at the best ask (Best ask), 
relative total depth on bid-side (Total bid-side) and relative total depth on ask-side (Total ask-side). Interval 1, 2, 
3 and 4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately following a trading halt. Interval -1, -2, -3 and -4 
represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately before a trading halt. Interval (1, 20) denotes the average 
measure during the period between interval 1 and 20 following a trading halt. Similarly, (-20, -1) refers to the 
period between interval -1 and interval -20 interval prior to a trading halt. Similarly for (-40, -1), (1, 40), (-80, -
1) and (1, 80).  For the abnormal measures, *, **, *** denotes the statistical significance, at the one, five and ten 
percent levels, respectively using Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests. 
Abnormal Relative Order Depth % 
Interval Best bid  Best ask  Total       bid-side 
Total      
ask-side 
[-80,-1] 0.0149*** 0.0010 -0.0027*** -0.0085*** 
[-40,-1] 0.0161*** 0.0010 -0.0041*** -0.0085*** 
[-20-1] 0.0178*** 0.0009 -0.0049*** -0.0100*** 
-4 0.0199*** 0.0015 -0.0215*** -0.0153*** 
-3 0.0293*** 0.0020 -0.0161*** -0.0199*** 
-2 0.0245*** 0.0013*** -0.0129*** -0.0194*** 
-1 0.0215*** 0.0012 -0.0018*** -0.0212*** 
1 -0.0106*** -0.0159*** 0.0369 -0.0115** 
2 0.0134*** -0.0032 0.0242*** -0.0368*** 
3 0.0167*** -0.0025 0.0251*** -0.0280*** 
4 0.0092*** -0.0058** 0.0295*** -0.0259*** 
[1,20] 0.0095*** -0.0025** 0.0192 -0.0067*** 
[1,40] 0.0127*** -0.0001*** 0.0241 -0.0000** 
[1, 80] 0.0174*** -0.0000*** 0.0227* 0.0018 
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These results are inconsistent with hypothesis 4 because order depth at the best bid and ask, 
are not abnormally low before a trading halt, however both order depth at the best bid and ask 
are abnormally low in the 15 minutes immediately after a trading halt. This result is similar to 
the finding of Corwin and Lipson (2000), except that they find that abnormal depth at the best 
quotes before and after a trading halt. This disparity may be explained by the different market 
microstructure being examined. Corwin and Lipson (2000) examine trading halts on the 
NYSE where specialists influence order depth at the best quotes. Specialists may set their 
quotes wider leading up to a trading halt as they may fear holding an unwanted position 
during a trading halt.  
 
Results for total order depth on both the bid and ask side are further reported in Table 6.8. 
Total bid-side depth is significant and abnormally low before a trading halt, as shown by 
interval [-20,-1] (-0.0049%). This reverts immediately following a trading halt (abnormal bid-
side depth in interval 1, 0.0369%) and remains high for the remainder of the post-halt 
intervals. Total ask-side depth displays a different pattern, with total ask-side depth 
significant and abnormally low, before and immediately after a trading halt. Total ask-side 
depth remains abnormally low for up to 11 intervals (165 minutes) before becoming 
abnormally high as shown by interval [1,80] (0.0018). Taken together the results for total 
ask-side and bid-side order depth suggest that total depth in the order book is abnormally low 
before a trading halt, before becoming abnormally high after a trading halt.  
 
Corwin and Lipson (2000) attribute part of the increase in total order depth in the post-halt 
periods to stale orders that do not reflect new information. As the price moves away from 
these orders, depth away from the best quotes increases but only on one side of the market. 
Corwin and Lipson (2000) find total depth on the bid-side is abnormally high for ‘good news’ 
halts, whereas abnormal total depth on the ask-side does not differ from zero. Just the 
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opposite occurs for ‘bad news’ halts. The results in Table 6.8 suggest that abnormal total 
depth increases after a trading halt on the bid-side more than the ask-side. The sample is 
dominated by ‘good news’ halts (51%) which may suggest that the relatively larger abnormal 
bid-side depth may consistent with the explanation of Corwin and Lipson (2000) . To 
examine this further, Table 6.9 reports abnormal total bid-side and ask-side order depth, 
separated by the price change during the trading halt. 
6.2.3.2. Order Depth by Price change 
Table 6.9 reports, for ‘good news’ halts, total order depth on the bid-side is significant and 
abnormally high in interval 1 (0.0645%) and interval [1, 20] (0.0259%). Total ask-side depth 
is still significant, however total ask-side depth is very close to zero and much lower than the 
bid-side in interval 1 (0.0103%) and interval [1, 20] (0.0016%). This suggests a similar 
pattern to Corwin and Lipson (2000) for ‘good news’ trading halts. However, for ‘bad news’ 
halts, total depth on the bid-side is significant and abnormally high in interval [1, 20] 
(0.0231%). The ask-side total depth is abnormally low in both interval 1 (-0.0445%) and 
interval [1, 20] (-0.0087%). This result does not support the notion that the increase in total 
abnormal depth may be due to stale orders that do not reflect new information. 
 
To further investigate, ‘no news’ halts are also reported in Table 6.9. There is no evidence of 
an increase in total depth on either the bid or ask side for ‘no news’ halts. In fact, total depth 
is abnormally low for both the bid-side (-0.0088%) and ask-side (-0.0285%) in interval [1, 
20]. This supports the explanation of Corwin and Lipson (2000) because when the price does 
not move, depth away from the best quotes does not increase on either side of the market. 
Overall the results in Table 7.8 and Table 7.9 are consistent with hypothesis 3. However, it 
appears that at least some of the increase in total depth in the post-halt period may be due to 
stale orders. To test this further it would be necessary examine the amount of order 
submissions and cancellations to determine whether these orders are in fact stale orders.  
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Table 6.9 Abnormal Order Depth by Price Change 
This Table shows the average abnormal order depth behaviour around trading halts for the matched sample. Order depth is represented by relative depth at the best bid (Best bid), 
relative depth at the best ask (Best ask), relative total depth on bid-side (Total bid-side) and relative total depth on ask-side (Total ask-side). Interval 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent 
fifteen-minute intervals immediately following a trading halt. Interval -1, -2, -3 and -4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately before a trading halt. Interval (1, 20) 
denotes the average measure during the period between interval 1 and 20 following a trading halt. Similarly, (-20, -1) refers to the period between interval -1 and interval -20 
interval prior to a trading halt. Similarly for (-40, -1), (1, 40), (-80, -1) and (1, 80). For the abnormal measures, *, **, *** denotes the statistical significance, at the one, five and 
ten percent levels, respectively using Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests. Price change represents the price change during the trading halt. 
Abnormal Relative Order Depth % by: 
 Negative (Bad News) Positive (Good News) Zero (No News) 
 Best bid  Best ask  Total bid-side  
Total 
ask-side  Best bid  Best ask  
Total 
bid-side  
Total ask-
side  Best bid  Best ask  
Total 
bid-side  
Total 
ask-side  
[-80,-1] 0.0416 -0.0001 0.0159 -0.0288222** 0.0021*** 0.0011 -0.0143** 0.006 0.0039 0.0026 -0.0022*** -0.0144* 
[-40,-1] 0.0445** -0.0006 0.0148** -0.0326** 0.0022*** 0.0017 -0.0132** 0.0088* 0.0055** 0.0015 -0.0113*** -0.0159 
[-20-1] 0.0493*** 0.0005 0.0163*** -0.0319** 0.0021*** 0.0014 -0.0143** 0.0079* 0.0067*** 0.0002 -0.0156*** -0.0237** 
-4 0.0540* -0.0042 -0.0020*** -0.0507* -0.0001 0.0042 -0.0139*** 0.0120** 0.0171** 0.0063 -0.1593*** -0.0577** 
-3 0.0714* -0.0027 0.0147*** -0.0598* 0.0052* 0.0029 -0.0134** 0.0098*** 0.0220** 0.0158 -0.1703*** -0.0614*** 
-2 0.0569*** -0.0034* 0.0069*** -0.0632 0.0056** 0.0036* -0.0079*** 0.0119** 0.0221* 0.0053 -0.1427*** -0.0601*** 
-1 0.0480*** 0.0013** 0.0256*** -0.0622** 0.0053 0.0012 -0.0070*** 0.0056*** 0.0248 0.0013 -0.0916*** -0.0389*** 
1 0.0260*** -0.0143*** 0.0013*** -0.0445 -0.0365*** -0.0177*** 0.0645*** 0.0103*** 0.0142*** -0.0021 -0.0045*** -0.0242** 
2 0.0339*** -0.0022 -0.0088*** -0.0551 0.0000*** -0.0031 0.0475 -0.0165*** 0.0192 -0.0078 0.0034*** -0.0955 
3 0.0518 -0.0077* -0.0065*** -0.0457 -0.0036*** -0.0001** 0.0474 -0.0103*** 0.0112* 0.0055** 0.0043** -0.0723 
4 0.03 -0.0107 -0.0021*** -0.0334 -0.0064*** -0.0054*** 0.0445* -0.0144*** 0.0276 0.0107*** 0.0555** -0.0694 
[1,20] 0.0339 -0.0021 0.0231*** -0.0087 -0.0051*** -0.0035*** 0.0259*** 0.0016*** 0.0086* 0.0000* -0.0088*** -0.0285 
[1,40] 0.0374 -0.0014 0.0316*** -0.0078** -0.0018*** -0.0000*** 0.0278*** 0.0110*** 0.0107 0.0004 -0.0015*** -0.0203 
[1, 80] 0.0419** -0.001 0.0317** -0.0073*** 0.0047*** 0.0000*** 0.0247*** 0.0141** 0.0107 0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0190 
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6.3. Volatility Impacts 
6.3.1. Volatility: Full and Matched sample  
Table 6.10 reports the results for the abnormal absolute midpoint return measure (ABSRET) 
used as the main estimator of volatility for both the full and matched sample. As expected, 
results are similar to the trading volume results, with the full sample showing stronger but 
qualitatively similar results to the matched sample. Abnormal volatility is low and not 
significantly different from zero in most cases in the pre-halt period. Immediately after the 
trading halt, abnormal volatility in the matched sample increases significantly from -0.0050% 
in interval -1 to 1.0015% in interval 1. Abnormal and significantly high volatility continues in 
the post-halt period as shown by the average abnormal volatility in intervals [1, 20] 
(0.1726%), [1, 40] (0.1025%) and [1, 80] (0.0577%). 
 
Figure 6.6 graphs the abnormal volatility around a trading halt for both the full and matched 
samples. Abnormal volatility is effectively zero in the pre-halt period, before increasing 
significantly immediately after a trading halt. Abnormal volatility persists for over one 
trading day before returning to the pseudo-halt levels represented by zero. This suggests 
trading halts cause volatility to spill over and persist for longer periods after an information 
announcement. The full sample and matched sample present similar results except for higher 
volatility in interval 1 for the full sample. This difference represents the excess volatility 
caused by the release of information that alters fundamental values. The matched sample  
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Table 6.10 Abnormal Volatility: Full Vs Matched Sample 
This Table shows the average abnormal volatility behaviour around trading halts. Volatility is represented by 
absolute abnormal midpoint returns (ABSRET %). Full represents the full sample and matched indicates the 
pseudo-halt matched sample. Interval 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately following a 
trading halt. Interval -1, -2, -3 and -4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately before a trading halt. 
Interval (1, 20) denotes the average measure during the period between interval 1 and 20 following a trading 
halt. Similarly, (-20, -1) refers to the period between interval -1 and interval -20 interval prior to a trading halt. 
Similarly for (-40, -1), (1, 40), (-80, -1) and (1, 80). For the abnormal measures, *, **, *** denotes the statistical 
significance, at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively using Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests. 
Interval Full (%) Matched (%) 
[-80,-1] -0.0081 -0.0065 
[-40,-1] 0.0058 0.0050 
[-20-1] 0.0072 0.0070 
-4 0.0055 0.0121 
-3 0.0177 0.0170* 
-2 0.0363 0.0175 
-1 -0.0006 -0.0050 
1 1.7234*** 1.0015*** 
2 0.5037*** 0.3993*** 
3 0.3409*** 0.2716*** 
4 0.2792*** 0.2312*** 
[1,20] 0.2424*** 0.1726*** 
[1,40] 0.1419*** 0.1025*** 
[1, 80] 0.0796*** 0.0577*** 
Figure 6.6 Abnormal Volatility: Full Vs Matched Sample 
This Figure displays the average abnormal volatility for the full and matched sample over the event period        
[-80, 80]. 
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controls for this, and the results illustrate there is still a large proportion of positive abnormal 
volatility that may be attributable to the trading halt. This is consistent with hypothesis 5.  
 
This result is consistent with Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994), Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995) 
and Corwin and Lipson (2000). Conversely, the results conflict with the more recent findings 
of Engelen and Kabir (2006) who find trading halts are effective in reducing excess volatility. 
This may be explained by the contrasting control methods used. Engelen and Kabir (2006) do 
not control for the amount of information being released and only compare the pre-halt and 
post-halt levels of volatility.  Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) and Aitken, Frino and Winn 
(1995) use similar controls to this study which account for the amount of information being 
released. 
6.3.2. Volatility by Market capitalisation, Trading halt duration, Price change 
 and Announcement type 
Table 6.11 reports the abnormal volatility results based on the market capitalisation of the 
halted stock. Abnormal volatility is similar in the pre-halt intervals for all three categories. 
The post-halt results suggest that abnormal volatility is higher for smaller stocks immediately 
following a trading halt. This result persists in the post-halt period (interval [1, 20]), were 
abnormal volatility is higher for the smallest stocks (0.1914%) compared to the largest stocks 
(-0.0210%). Volatility in the post-halt period dissipates at a similar rate for all three 
categories, (see Figure 6.7).  This result is consistent with hypothesis 8 and can be explained 
by the lower uncertainty and asymmetric information in larger stocks that are widely 
followed by analysts. 
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Figure 6.7 Abnormal Volatility by Market Capitalisation 
This Figure displays the average abnormal volatility for the matched sample over the event period [-80, 80]. 
Results are separated by market capitalisation. 
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Table 6.11 further reports the abnormal volatility results separated by the duration of the 
trading halt. Abnormal volatility immediately following a trading halt is significantly higher 
(interval 1, 2.4991%) and persists for longer (interval [1, 80], 0.1946%) in the post-halt 
period for trading halts of longer durations (60+). Figure 6.8 illustrates the results graphically 
were volatility is higher and persists for longer following trading halts of greater duration. 
This is inconsistent with hypothesis 7 and can be explained by the ‘learn-by-trade’ class 
models discussed in Chapter 4. Table 6.11 further reports the volatility results separated by 
the price change over the trading halt. Abnormal volatility is similar to the matched sample 
for ‘good news’ and ‘bad news’ halts, while the results differ for ‘no news’ halts.  
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Figure 6.8 Abnormal Volatility by Trading Halt Duration 
This Figure displays the average abnormal volatility for the matched sample over the event period [-80, 80]. 
Results are separated by trading halt duration. 
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‘No news’ trading halts exhibit small and mostly insignificant abnormal volatility in the pre-
halt (Interval [-80,-1], -0.0287%) and post-halt (Interval [1, 80], 0.0013%) periods. ‘No 
news’ trading halts are associated with less informative news announcements which suggest 
that trading halts do not cause abnormal volatility for less informative events. Table 6.11 also 
suggests that trading halts are not successful in controlling abnormal volatility around 
informative news announcements. These results support both hypothesis 9 and hypothesis 10.   
 
Table 6.12 reports the volatility results separated by the news announcement being released. 
As expected similar results to the abnormal volume measures in Table 6 are found. The 
largest abnormal values are observed for trading halts called for an ASX announcement or 
query. Abnormal volatility in the post-halt period for ASX announcement or query trading 
halts is 0.5581% (interval [1, 20]), this is significantly larger than the matched sample results 
(0.1726%) shown in Table 6.10. These trading halts appear to be called in reaction to large 
amounts of abnormal volatility in the pre-halt period (interval [-20, -1], 0.3750%). Each of 
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Table 6.11 Abnormal Volatility by Price change, Market Capitalisation and Trading Halt Duration 
This Table shows the average abnormal volatility behaviour around trading halts for the matched sample. Volatility is represented by absolute abnormal midpoint returns 
(ABSRET %). Interval 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately following a trading halt. Interval -1, -2, -3 and -4 represent fifteen-minute intervals 
immediately before a trading halt. Interval (1, 20) denotes the average measure during the period between interval 1 and 20 following a trading halt. Similarly, (-20, -1) refers to 
the period between interval -1 and interval -20 interval prior to a trading halt. Similarly for (-40, -1), (1, 40), (-80, -1) and (1, 80). For the abnormal measures, *, **, *** denotes 
the statistical significance, at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively using Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests. Price change represents the price change during the trading halt. 
Market Capitalisation represents the market capitalisation of the halted stock. Halt duration is the length of the trading halt in minutes. 
Abnormal Volatility % by: 
Category Price change Market Capitalisation Halt Duration (Minutes) 
Interval ‘Bad News’ ‘Good News’ ‘No News’ Top 50 51-200 201+ <15 15-30 30-60 60+ 
[-80,-1] 0.0015*** -0.0041 -0.0287*** -0.0591* 0.0061* -0.0019 -0.0047 -0.0400 0.0790 0.0419*** 
[-40,-1] 0.0148*** 0.0067 -0.0187*** -0.0634 0.0108** 0.0092 0.0072 -0.0444 0.1385 0.0879*** 
[-20-1] 0.0087 0.0143 -0.0186 -0.0594* 0.0161*** 0.0127 0.0081 -0.0353 0.1379 0.1033 
-4 0.0306 0.0001 0.0143 -0.0142* 0.0178 0.0133 0.0167 -0.0526 0.0566 0.0889* 
-3 -0.0011 0.0298* 0.0119 -0.0437 0.0505 0.0206* 0.0163 -0.0456 0.4112 0.2128* 
-2 0.0607 0.0029 -0.0190* -0.0156 0.0348 0.0238 0.0196 -0.0393 0.1495 0.1344 
-1 0.0158 -0.0139 -0.0197 -0.0315 0.0241 -0.0073 -0.0073 -0.0175 -0.1830 0.1541 
1 0.8216*** 1.4492*** -0.0383** 0.2334*** 0.5357*** 1.0961*** 0.9471*** 1.0807*** 1.7540*** 2.4991*** 
2 0.3492*** 0.5553*** 0.0135 0.0394*** 0.2244*** 0.4423*** 0.3835*** 0.3831*** 0.6237*** 0.9801*** 
3 0.2395*** 0.3807*** -0.0035 0.0213*** 0.1272*** 0.2971*** 0.2620*** 0.2564*** 0.6047*** 0.6129*** 
4 0.2466*** 0.3025*** -0.0174 -0.0001*** 0.0825*** 0.2571*** 0.2105*** 0.3127*** 0.3772*** 0.6274*** 
[1,20] 0.1647*** 0.2358*** -0.0061*** -0.0210*** 0.0854*** 0.1914*** 0.1624*** 0.1795*** 0.3381*** 0.4766*** 
[1,40] 0.1005*** 0.1377*** -0.0018* -0.0307*** 0.0537*** 0.1151*** 0.0963*** 0.0994*** 0.2206*** 0.3106*** 
[1, 80] 0.0535*** 0.0787*** 0.0013 -0.0397*** 0.0302*** 0.0659*** 0.0544*** 0.04901*** 0.1235*** 0.1946*** 
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the other categories, result in either insignificant or close to zero abnormal volatility for the 
same pre-halt period. Table 6.12 further shows that post-halt volatility is high for all types of 
news announcements, suggesting that announcement type is not a factor in explaining 
abnormal post-halt volatility. 
 
6.4. Return Impacts 
6.3.1 Abnormal Returns: Full sample 
Table 6.13 reports the AAR’s and the CAAR’s that have been calculated starting 80 intervals 
before a trading halt, until 80 intervals after a trading halt. For the purposes of brevity, the 
results are presented for only 15 intervals either side of the trading halt. Figure 6.9, graphs the 
CAAR’s for eighty intervals either side of the trading halt. There appears to be a significant 
amount of abnormal return behaviour around a trading halt. In the pre-halt period, there is a 
significant positive trend with a CAAR of 1.219% in the 80 intervals leading into a trading 
halt. This may suggest some anticipatory behaviour leading into a trading halt. During the 
halt, there is a significant increase in the CAAR of 0.99%, followed by another large increase 
of 1.28% in interval 1. Following this, the CAAR’s continue to drift upwards until interval 25 
after a trading halt. Therefore, the abnormal returns are not restricted to the trading halt 
period itself. This is inconsistent with hypothesis 6 and suggests that trading halts are not 
effective in disseminating information. The results do however suggest that the price 
produced during a trading halt is accurate and efficient because there is no price reversal over 
the remainder of the 80 intervals. 
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Table 6.12 Abnormal Volatility by Announcement Type 
This Table shows the average abnormal volatility behaviour around trading halts for the matched sample. Volatility is represented by (ABSRET %) absolute abnormal returns. *, 
**, *** denotes the statistical significance, at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively, using Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests. Interval 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent fifteen-minute 
intervals immediately following a trading halt. Interval -1, -2, -3 and -4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately before a trading halt. Interval (1, 20) denotes the average 
measure during the period between interval 1 and 20 following a trading halt. Similarly, (-20, -1) refers to the period between interval -1 and interval -20 interval prior to a 
trading halt. Similarly for (-40, -1), (1, 40), (-80, -1) and (1, 80).  Announcement Type represents categories formed based on the announcement made during each trading halt. 
Announcement Type 
Interval 
Asset 
Acquisition/ 
Disposal 
ASX 
Announcement/Query 
Financial 
Information Miscellaneous Progress Report Share Issue 
Takeover 
Related 
[-80,-1] -0.0057 0.1964*** -0.0234 -0.0294 -0.0064 -0.0080 -0.0350*** 
[-40,-1] -0.0109 0.3300*** -0.0230 -0.0022 0.0021 -0.0035 -0.0380*** 
[-20-1] 0.0015 0.3750*** -0.0223 0.0100 -0.0008 -0.0181** -0.0261*** 
-4 -0.0831** 0.1870*** 0.0076 0.0331 0.0147 -0.0028 -0.0096 
-3 -0.0326 0.3874*** -0.0122 0.0549 0.0138 -0.0592* 0.0031 
-2 0.0271 0.2949*** 0.0124 0.1830 -0.0339 -0.0164 0.0076 
-1 -0.0604* 0.3377*** -0.0239 -0.0009 -0.0066 -0.0684 0.0087 
1 1.2760*** 2.4262*** 0.6697*** 0.5956*** 1.1292*** 1.1311*** 0.3778*** 
2 0.3523*** 1.0945*** 0.3109*** 0.2568*** 0.4558*** 0.3508*** 0.1329*** 
3 0.2375*** 0.8289*** 0.2098*** 0.1606*** 0.2914*** 0.3833*** 0.0343** 
4 0.2096*** 0.5622*** 0.1637*** 0.2371*** 0.2612*** 0.1994*** 0.0223** 
[1,20] 0.1918*** 0.5581*** 0.1181*** 0.1235*** 0.1843*** 0.2041*** 0.0261 
[1,40] 0.1256*** 0.3847*** 0.0653*** 0.0737*** 0.1049*** 0.1312*** 0.0075 
[1, 80] 0.0678*** 0.2541*** 0.0345*** 0.0407*** 0.0568*** 0.0825*** 0.0029 
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Figure 6.9 CAAR’s around Trading Halts 
This Figure displays the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR’s) for the full sample over the 
event period [-80, 80]. 
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6.4.1. Abnormal Returns by Price change, Market capitalisation and Trading 
 halt duration 
To examine these results in more detail, Table 7.14 reports the CAAR’s separated by the 
price change during the trading halt. Figure 6.10 graphs these result for the full period [-80, 
80] and illustrates that ‘no news’ trading halts exhibit no significant abnormal returns before, 
during or after a trading halt. This is as expected, suggesting that ‘no news’ trading halts are 
initiated for the release of less informative announcements that have no significant impact on 
the returns generated. The ‘good news’ halts exhibit a very similar pattern to the full sample 
while the ‘bad news’ halts provide some unanticipated results. 
 
Firstly, there is a strong upward trend in the pre-halt period resulting in a significant CAAR 
of 2.137% between interval -80 and interval -1. This is followed by a significant drop of -
3.43% during the trading halt and in interval 1. The CAAR continues to fall slowly over the 
next seven intervals before levelling out over the remainder of the periods. These results for 
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Table 6.13 Abnormal Returns around Trading Halts 
This Table shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) behaviour around trading halts for the full 
sample. Abnormal returns are computed using the return on the halted stock less the return on the All Ordinaries 
Index. p-values for both standard t-statistics and Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests are presented. CAAR’s are 
cumulated starting 80 intervals before the trading halt and ending 80 intervals after the trading halt. Each 
interval consists of 15 minutes and represents the CAAR from interval -80 until that interval. CAAR’s are only 
presented from interval -15 to interval 15 for the purposes of brevity.  
Interval AAR p-value (t-stat) 
p-value 
 (Wilcox) CAAR 
p-value 
 (t-stat) 
p-value 
 (Wilcox) 
-15 0.011% 0.188 0.213 0.920% 0.000 0.000 
-14 0.033% 0.060 0.029 0.958% 0.000 0.000 
-13 0.004% 0.592 0.010 0.966% 0.000 0.000 
-12 0.034% 0.000 0.660 1.000% 0.000 0.000 
-11 0.023% 0.014 0.771 1.024% 0.000 0.000 
-10 0.014% 0.107 0.697 1.038% 0.000 0.000 
-9 0.022% 0.012 0.187 1.059% 0.000 0.000 
-8 0.012% 0.181 0.039 1.071% 0.000 0.000 
-7 0.004% 0.682 0.711 1.078% 0.000 0.000 
-6 0.023% 0.018 0.031 1.104% 0.000 0.000 
-5 0.017% 0.092 0.284 1.120% 0.000 0.000 
-4 0.000% 0.969 0.002 1.119% 0.000 0.000 
-3 0.025% 0.024 0.000 1.145% 0.000 0.000 
-2 0.035% 0.042 0.156 1.181% 0.000 0.000 
-1 0.038% 0.001 0.021 1.219% 0.000 0.000 
Halt 0.990% 0.000 0.000 2.209% 0.000 0.000 
1 1.276% 0.000 0.000 3.493% 0.000 0.000 
2 0.040% 0.026 0.594 3.551% 0.000 0.000 
3 0.015% 0.315 0.055 3.568% 0.000 0.000 
4 0.016% 0.224 0.024 3.585% 0.000 0.000 
5 0.017% 0.176 0.345 3.602% 0.000 0.000 
6 0.001% 0.970 0.005 3.601% 0.000 0.000 
7 0.014% 0.292 0.359 3.614% 0.000 0.000 
8 0.026% 0.030 0.019 3.640% 0.000 0.000 
9 0.010% 0.368 0.000 3.653% 0.000 0.000 
10 0.020% 0.087 0.003 3.677% 0.000 0.000 
11 0.014% 0.147 0.177 3.689% 0.000 0.000 
12 0.049% 0.227 0.103 3.738% 0.000 0.000 
13 -0.011% 0.342 0.016 3.733% 0.000 0.000 
14 0.010% 0.357 0.068 3.747% 0.000 0.000 
15 0.014% 0.250 0.067 3.759% 0.000 0.000 
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 the ‘bad news’ halts are unanticipated for two reasons. First, there is a positive price run up 
in the pre-halt period for ‘bad news’ trading halts. If there was correct anticipatory trading 
behaviour in the market, ‘bad news’ trading halts should show a negative run up. This could 
only be explained by investors that anticipate trading halts and trade in the incorrect direction 
to the information released during the trading halt. Secondly, ‘price discovery’ occurs faster 
on ‘bad news’ halts rather than ‘good news’ halts.38 This finding is surprising because 
previous studies such as Kryzanowski (1979) suggest there should be lags and frictions in the 
downward adjustment of security prices, due to the many restrictions on short selling.  
 
 
Figure 6.10 CAAR’s around Trading Halts by Price change 
This Figure displays the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR’s) for the full sample over the event 
period [-80, 80]. Results are separated by the price change during the trading halt. 
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38
  The abnormal returns disappear at a faster rate for rate for ‘bad news’, suggesting that price discovery occurs 
faster.  
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Table 6.14 Abnormal Returns by Price Change 
This Table shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) behaviour around trading halts for the full 
sample. Abnormal returns are computed using the return on the halted stock less the return on the All Ordinaries 
Index. p-values for both standard t-statistics and Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests are presented. CAAR’s are 
cumulated starting 80 intervals before the trading halt and ending 80 intervals after the trading halt. Each 
interval consists of 15 minutes and represents the CAAR from interval -80 until that interval. CAAR’s are only 
presented from interval -15 to interval 15 for the purposes of brevity. Price change represents the price change 
during the trading halt. 
Interval ‘Bad News’ ‘Good News’ ‘No News’ 
 
CAAR p-value 
 (t-stat) 
p-value 
 (Wilcox) CAAR 
p-value 
 (t-stat) 
p-value 
 (Wilcox) CAAR 
p-value 
 (t-stat) 
p-value 
 (Wilcox) 
-15 1.536% 0.000 0.000 0.786% 0.000 0.011 0.182% 0.220 0.037 
-14 1.614% 0.000 0.000 0.800% 0.000 0.019 0.225% 0.138 0.025 
-13 1.652% 0.000 0.000 0.799% 0.000 0.024 0.204% 0.181 0.012 
-12 1.699% 0.000 0.000 0.825% 0.000 0.009 0.238% 0.124 0.011 
-11 1.755% 0.000 0.000 0.846% 0.000 0.002 0.213% 0.180 0.006 
-10 1.765% 0.000 0.000 0.861% 0.000 0.003 0.231% 0.146 0.008 
-9 1.789% 0.000 0.000 0.884% 0.000 0.001 0.239% 0.134 0.009 
-8 1.784% 0.000 0.000 0.907% 0.000 0.001 0.252% 0.116 0.013 
-7 1.810% 0.000 0.000 0.905% 0.000 0.001 0.250% 0.120 0.021 
-6 1.856% 0.000 0.000 0.916% 0.000 0.000 0.284% 0.079 0.037 
-5 1.889% 0.000 0.000 0.941% 0.000 0.000 0.243% 0.132 0.020 
-4 1.925% 0.000 0.000 0.926% 0.000 0.000 0.217% 0.176 0.010 
-3 1.959% 0.000 0.000 0.953% 0.000 0.000 0.218% 0.178 0.011 
-2 2.038% 0.000 0.000 0.966% 0.000 0.000 0.251% 0.121 0.015 
-1 2.137% 0.000 0.000 0.970% 0.000 0.000 0.288% 0.074 0.024 
Halt -0.103% 0.000 0.000 4.090% 0.000 0.000 0.288% 0.000 0.000 
1 -1.297% 0.000 0.566 7.157% 0.000 0.000 0.362% 0.026 0.050 
2 -1.477% 0.000 0.551 7.361% 0.000 0.000 0.390% 0.016 0.097 
3 -1.588% 0.000 0.116 7.450% 0.000 0.000 0.407% 0.013 0.095 
4 -1.660% 0.000 0.052 7.523% 0.000 0.000 0.409% 0.013 0.077 
5 -1.686% 0.001 0.045 7.573% 0.000 0.000 0.399% 0.017 0.071 
6 -1.737% 0.002 0.011 7.608% 0.000 0.000 0.382% 0.022 0.051 
7 -1.741% 0.003 0.011 7.642% 0.000 0.000 0.352% 0.035 0.049 
8 -1.744% 0.003 0.012 7.674% 0.000 0.000 0.417% 0.015 0.081 
9 -1.755% 0.004 0.010 7.703% 0.000 0.000 0.423% 0.013 0.080 
10 -1.752% 0.004 0.011 7.745% 0.000 0.000 0.424% 0.014 0.079 
11 -1.790% 0.008 0.003 7.793% 0.000 0.000 0.414% 0.016 0.070 
12 -1.785% 0.007 0.004 7.876% 0.000 0.000 0.434% 0.011 0.067 
13 -1.820% 0.015 0.002 7.895% 0.000 0.000 0.408% 0.018 0.050 
14 -1.793% 0.010 0.002 7.898% 0.000 0.000 0.430% 0.013 0.050 
15 -1.819% 0.015 0.001 7.938% 0.000 0.000 0.422% 0.016 0.042 
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Table 6.15 and reports the CAAR’s separated by market capitalisation. The results show that 
the CAAR is highest for smallest stocks over the period surrounding a trading halt. Figure 
6.11 illustrates that smaller stocks exhibit the most significant abnormal returns before a 
trading halt compared to larger stocks. This could suggest greater information leakage for 
smaller stocks. During a trading halt, there are lower abnormal returns for the smallest stocks 
(0.22%) compared to the largest stocks (1.9%). Immediately following a trading halt, 
significant abnormal returns are observed for the smallest stocks (1.42%) compared to the 
largest stocks (0.06%). The post-halt period for smaller stocks results in significant abnormal 
returns as shown by the CAAR of 1.86% during the first 25 intervals after a trading halt. This 
suggests that ‘price discovery’ is not contained in the trading halt for smaller stocks. In 
contrast, trading halts on larger stocks appear to be installed unexpectedly and re-opened 
when the entire ‘price discovery’ has occurred.  
Figure 6.11 CAAR’s around Trading Halts by Market Capitalisation 
This Figure displays the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR’s) for the full sample over the event 
period [-80, 80]. Results are separated by market capitalisation. 
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Table 6.15 Abnormal Returns by Market Capitalisation 
This Table shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) behaviour around trading halts for the full 
sample. Abnormal returns are computed using the return on the halted stock less the return on the All Ordinaries 
Index. p-values for both standard t-statistics and Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests are presented. CAAR’s are 
cumulated starting 80 intervals before the trading halt and ending 80 intervals after the trading halt. Each 
interval consists of 15 minutes and represents the CAAR from interval -80 until that interval. CAAR’s are only 
presented from interval -15 to interval 15 for the purposes of brevity. Market Capitalisation represents the 
market capitalisation of the halted stocks grouped into three categories.  
 Top 50 51-200 201+ 
Interval CAAR p-value 
 (t-stat) 
p-value 
 (Wilcox) CAAR 
p-value 
 (t-stat) 
p-value 
 (Wilcox) CAAR 
p-value 
 (t-stat) 
p-value 
 (Wilcox) 
-15 0.002% 0.980 0.682 0.137% 0.206 0.308 0.960% 0.000 0.000 
-14 0.007% 0.929 0.668 0.132% 0.226 0.357 0.995% 0.000 0.000 
-13 0.012% 0.875 0.586 0.120% 0.271 0.354 1.010% 0.000 0.000 
-12 0.009% 0.910 0.731 0.128% 0.246 0.376 1.047% 0.000 0.000 
-11 0.023% 0.771 0.826 0.131% 0.232 0.346 1.071% 0.000 0.000 
-10 0.016% 0.847 0.813 0.150% 0.172 0.192 1.085% 0.000 0.000 
-9 -0.006% 0.946 0.536 0.155% 0.158 0.141 1.108% 0.000 0.000 
-8 0.007% 0.930 0.600 0.148% 0.181 0.167 1.117% 0.000 0.000 
-7 0.017% 0.836 0.719 0.147% 0.189 0.146 1.120% 0.000 0.000 
-6 0.019% 0.825 0.546 0.154% 0.167 0.133 1.150% 0.000 0.000 
-5 0.026% 0.757 0.605 0.158% 0.162 0.125 1.172% 0.000 0.000 
-4 0.032% 0.706 0.657 0.163% 0.152 0.143 1.158% 0.000 0.000 
-3 0.045% 0.593 0.799 0.186% 0.114 0.138 1.187% 0.000 0.000 
-2 0.045% 0.605 0.736 0.216% 0.072 0.082 1.225% 0.000 0.000 
-1 0.050% 0.559 0.794 0.205% 0.090 0.148 1.270% 0.000 0.000 
Halt 1.950% 0.000 0.000 0.505% 0.000 0.000 1.490% 0.000 0.000 
1 2.014% 0.256 0.693 0.812% 0.001 0.000 2.914% 0.000 0.000 
2 2.026% 0.221 0.564 0.785% 0.002 0.001 2.978% 0.000 0.000 
3 2.017% 0.260 0.569 0.768% 0.002 0.002 2.990% 0.000 0.000 
4 1.998% 0.348 0.734 0.766% 0.003 0.001 3.012% 0.000 0.000 
5 1.999% 0.345 0.733 0.767% 0.003 0.002 3.031% 0.000 0.000 
6 1.991% 0.388 0.675 0.762% 0.003 0.001 3.023% 0.000 0.000 
7 1.987% 0.408 0.684 0.768% 0.003 0.001 3.043% 0.000 0.000 
8 1.987% 0.415 0.695 0.771% 0.003 0.001 3.076% 0.000 0.000 
9 1.990% 0.403 0.652 0.765% 0.004 0.001 3.100% 0.000 0.000 
10 1.988% 0.415 0.762 0.766% 0.004 0.001 3.123% 0.000 0.000 
11 1.989% 0.411 0.706 0.762% 0.004 0.001 3.142% 0.000 0.000 
12 2.002% 0.355 0.661 0.765% 0.004 0.001 3.195% 0.000 0.000 
13 1.993% 0.393 0.661 0.760% 0.005 0.001 3.188% 0.000 0.000 
14 2.008% 0.329 0.505 0.775% 0.004 0.001 3.201% 0.000 0.000 
15 2.017% 0.294 0.416 0.772% 0.004 0.001 3.218% 0.000 0.000 
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Table 6.16 reports the CAAR’s separated by the duration of the trading halt. The results 
present mixed evidence regarding the impact of trading halt duration on abnormal returns 
surrounding trading halts. Abnormal returns are higher for trading halts of longer durations, 
which was expected based on the descriptive statistics in Table 7.1. Figure 6.12 graphs the 
CAAR’s and illustrates that trading halts of less than 30 minutes exhibit similar patterns to 
those of less than 15 minutes, suggesting that trading halt duration does not impact on 
abnormal returns. Overall Figure 6.12 suggests that abnormal returns, excluding the 
discernable pattern of larger CAAR’s around trading halt of longer duration, are not affected 
by trading halt duration. 
 
Figure 6.12 CAAR’s around Trading Halts by Trading Halt Duration 
This Figure displays the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR’s) for the full sample over the event 
period [-80, 80]. Results are separated by the trading halt duration (Minutes). 
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Table 6.16 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns by Trading Halt Duration 
This Table shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) behaviour around trading halts for the full 
sample. Abnormal returns are computed using the return on the halted stock less the return on the All Ordinaries 
Index. p-values for both standard t-statistics and Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests are presented. CAAR’s are 
cumulated starting 80 intervals before the trading halt and ending 80 intervals after the trading halt. Each 
interval consists of 15 minutes and represents the CAAR from interval -80 until that interval. CAAR’s are only 
presented from interval -15 to interval 15 for the purposes of brevity.  Halt duration is the length of the trading 
halt in minutes. 
 <15 15-30 30-60 60+ 
Interva
l CAAR 
p-
value 
(t-stat) 
p-value 
(Wilcox) CAAR 
p-
value 
(t-stat) 
p-value 
(Wilcox
) 
CAAR p-value 
 (t-stat) 
p-value 
(Wilcox) CAAR 
p-value 
 (t-stat) 
p-value 
(Wilcox) 
-15 2.164% 0.000 0.000 1.148% 0.000 0.066 3.423% 0.007 0.020 0.829% 0.000 0.000 
-14 2.260% 0.000 0.000 1.248% 0.000 0.108 3.438% 0.006 0.023 0.858% 0.000 0.000 
-13 2.225% 0.000 0.000 1.298% 0.000 0.107 3.411% 0.005 0.022 0.863% 0.000 0.000 
-12 2.260% 0.000 0.000 1.353% 0.000 0.065 3.438% 0.005 0.019 0.895% 0.000 0.000 
-11 2.325% 0.000 0.000 1.397% 0.000 0.034 3.538% 0.004 0.018 0.914% 0.000 0.000 
-10 2.503% 0.000 0.000 1.406% 0.000 0.030 3.610% 0.006 0.020 0.922% 0.000 0.000 
-9 2.534% 0.000 0.000 1.446% 0.000 0.014 3.734% 0.006 0.017 0.940% 0.000 0.000 
-8 2.666% 0.000 0.000 1.479% 0.000 0.015 3.874% 0.008 0.020 0.945% 0.000 0.000 
-7 2.726% 0.000 0.000 1.493% 0.000 0.014 4.180% 0.005 0.016 0.946% 0.000 0.000 
-6 2.760% 0.000 0.000 1.622% 0.000 0.004 4.023% 0.004 0.021 0.961% 0.000 0.000 
-5 2.799% 0.000 0.000 1.585% 0.000 0.007 4.068% 0.003 0.018 0.983% 0.000 0.000 
-4 2.884% 0.000 0.000 1.582% 0.000 0.009 4.197% 0.003 0.020 0.978% 0.000 0.000 
-3 3.065% 0.000 0.000 1.641% 0.000 0.003 4.605% 0.002 0.010 0.991% 0.000 0.000 
-2 3.105% 0.000 0.000 1.675% 0.000 0.002 4.712% 0.001 0.009 1.027% 0.000 0.000 
-1 3.132% 0.000 0.000 1.767% 0.000 0.000 4.920% 0.001 0.005 1.058% 0.000 0.000 
Halt 9.102% 0.000 0.000 2.657% 0.000 0.000 5.460% 0.000 0.000 1.878% 0.000 0.000 
1 15.897% 0.000 0.000 4.124% 0.000 0.000 6.577% 0.001 0.002 2.929% 0.000 0.000 
2 15.970% 0.000 0.000 4.154% 0.000 0.000 6.075% 0.001 0.002 2.993% 0.000 0.000 
3 15.781% 0.000 0.000 4.163% 0.000 0.000 5.866% 0.001 0.003 3.021% 0.000 0.000 
4 15.748% 0.000 0.000 4.200% 0.000 0.000 5.868% 0.001 0.005 3.037% 0.000 0.000 
5 15.629% 0.000 0.000 4.201% 0.000 0.000 5.956% 0.001 0.002 3.061% 0.000 0.000 
6 15.650% 0.000 0.000 4.139% 0.000 0.000 5.863% 0.001 0.003 3.067% 0.000 0.000 
7 15.655% 0.000 0.000 4.111% 0.000 0.000 6.035% 0.001 0.002 3.084% 0.000 0.000 
8 15.618% 0.000 0.000 4.114% 0.000 0.000 6.365% 0.000 0.001 3.113% 0.000 0.000 
9 15.673% 0.000 0.000 4.102% 0.000 0.000 6.488% 0.000 0.001 3.127% 0.000 0.000 
10 15.625% 0.000 0.000 4.181% 0.000 0.000 6.263% 0.000 0.001 3.148% 0.000 0.000 
11 15.675% 0.000 0.000 4.160% 0.000 0.000 6.259% 0.001 0.002 3.163% 0.000 0.000 
12 15.591% 0.000 0.000 4.181% 0.000 0.000 6.358% 0.001 0.002 3.220% 0.000 0.000 
13 15.515% 0.000 0.000 4.194% 0.000 0.000 6.407% 0.001 0.002 3.216% 0.000 0.000 
14 15.537% 0.000 0.000 4.179% 0.000 0.000 6.213% 0.001 0.003 3.233% 0.000 0.000 
15 15.539% 0.000 0.000 4.213% 0.000 0.000 5.826% 0.001 0.003 3.247% 0.000 0.000 
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6.5. Supplemental Analyses 
6.5.1. Volatility and Order Depth 
To examine the relationship between post-halt volatility and order depth, Figure 6.13 graphs 
abnormal volatility and abnormal order depth at the best quotes. Figure 6.13 shows abnormal 
order depth at the best quotes (the bars) and abnormal volatility (the line). To limit scale 
differences, abnormal volatility corresponds to the left-hand Y-axis and the abnormal depth 
measure corresponds to the right-hand Y-axis. From Figure 6.13, it appears that there is a 
negative relationship between post-halt abnormal volatility and abnormal depth at the best 
quotes.  
 
 
Figure 6.13 Volatility Vs Order Depth 
This Figure displays the average values of abnormal volatility and best order depth for the matched sample over 
the event period [1, 3]. Abnormal depth (the bars) corresponds to the right-hand Y-axis. Abnormal volatility (the 
line) corresponds to the left-hand Y-axis. 
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The result in Figure 6.13 suggests that the high levels of volatility observed immediately after 
trading halts may result, at least partially, from changes in liquidity around the halt. However, 
these tests do not control for other factors that may explain changes in abnormal behaviour 
around trading halts. To control for these effects, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
of abnormal volatility on abnormal depth, abnormal volume, trading halt duration and market 
capitalisation is estimated.  
 
Table 6.17 Abnormal Volatility Regression 
This Table lists coefficients from a regression of abnormal volatility (during interval 1) on several explanatory 
variables. Interval 1 extends from the re-open until 15 minutes after the re-open. The matched sample of 16,113 
trading halts is used. The results are tested for heteroskedascity using White's general test. The null hypothesis 
of heteroskedascity is rejected at a 1% level of significance. The regression takes the following form: 
 
2 30  1 4  .    *   *  *  *  i i i i i iAbnormal Volatility a a AbnDepth a AbnVolume a MktCap a HaltDuration ε= + + + + +   
 
 
Intercept 
( 0a ) 
Abnormal 
Relative Best 
Order Depth 
( 1a ) 
Abnormal  
Trading Volume 
( 2a ) 
Market 
Capitalisation of 
halted stock ( 3a ) 
Trading halt 
duration 
(Minutes) 
( 4a ) 
Coefficient 0.0096 2.58 E-11 2.43 E-09 -4.78 E-13 5.75 E-6 
t-stat 22.87 0.63 12.57 -5.24 4.00 
p-value 0.0001 0.5294 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Adjusted R2 0.0189 
R2 0.0192 
Mean Abnormal  
Volatility 0.0100 
 
 
The regression results in Table 6.17 show that the coefficient of abnormal best depth is highly 
insignificant and provides no evidence of a relationship between abnormal depth and 
abnormal volatility. As expected, the coefficient on abnormal volume is significantly positive 
at a 1% level of significance. The coefficient for market capitalisation is significantly 
negative at a 1% level and confirms a negative relationship between abnormal volatility and 
market capitalisation. Table 6.14 also confirms a significant positive relationship, at a 1% 
level, between the duration of a trading halt and abnormal volatility.  
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Most importantly, after controlling for abnormal volume, abnormal depth, trading halt 
duration and market capitalisation the regression intercept remains highly significant. In 
addition, the magnitude of the intercept (0.00956) is similar to the magnitude of mean 
abnormal volatility (0.0100), suggesting that the model explains, at best, a small portion of 
the observed abnormal volatility. This is also consistent with the adjusted R2 of 0.0189.  
Taken together, the results in this section provide little support for hypothesis 11. It appears 
that other factors, such as unmeasured information effects or the closure of trading, explain 
the majority of the observed post-halt volatility. 
6.5.2. Alternative Matching Procedures 
As discussed in Section 6.8.2 the matching procedure for pseudo-halts may induce a bias as 
halts are only matched on returns within 1%. To ensure that the results in this study are not 
prone to this bias, Table 6.18 reports the abnormal results for volume, relative bid-ask 
spreads, volatility and order depth for the 0.05% matched sample. 10,080 of the initial 18,245 
trading halts can be matched within 0.05%. The 0.05% matched sample provides 
qualitatively similar results to those for the sample matched within 1%. This suggests that the 
matching procedure within 1% does not induce any bias. 
6.6. Limitations 
Whether a trading halt can be successfully matched with a pseudo-halt is not random. This 
matching process typically excludes trading halts with extremely large absolute price moves. 
There are two implications of this selection bias. First, by excluding large price moves, the 
power of the tests are reduced, thus biasing against finding a difference in the matched 
sample. Second, since halts can only be matched for relatively small halt returns, the resulting 
selection bias narrows the scope of the conclusions to trading halts with relatively small halt 
returns.   
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Table 6.18 Abnormal Measures around Trading Halts for Matched Sample (0.05%) 
This Table shows the average abnormal behaviour around trading halts for the 0.05% matched sample. Interval 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately 
following a trading halt. Interval -1, -2, -3 and -4 represent fifteen-minute intervals immediately before a trading halt. Interval (1, 20) denotes the average measure during the 
period between interval 1 and 20 following a trading halt. Similarly, (-20, -1) refers to the period between interval -1 and interval -20 interval prior to a trading halt. Similarly for 
(-40, -1), (1, 40), (-80, -1) and (1, 80). For the abnormal measures, *, **, *** denotes the statistical significance, at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively using 
Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests. 
Interval Volume Relative Bid-ask Spreads (%) Volatility (%) 
Best Bid Depth 
(%) 
Best Ask Depth 
(%) 
Total Bid-side 
Depth (%) 
Total Ask-side 
Depth (%) 
[-80,-1] -1,931 0.0245* -0.0119** 
 
0.0159 0.0031 0.0079*** 
 
-0.0015* 
 
[-40,-1] -611 0.0369 -0.0066 0.0153** 
 
0.0033 -0.0007*** 
 
-0.0003** 
 
[-20-1] 1,192 0.0771 -0.0038 0.0150*** 
 
0.0032 -0.0054*** 
 
-0.0019*** 
 
-4 -801 0.0801 0.0220 0.0202*** 
 
0.0065 -0.0165*** 
 
-0.0018** 
 
-3 2,866 0.0621 0.0169 0.0233*** 
 
0.0081*** 
 
-0.0214*** 
 
-0.0040*** 
 
-2 7,115 0.0659 0.0376 0.0157** 
 
0.0070*** 
 
-0.0137*** 
 
-0.0035*** 
 
-1 1,025 0.0857 -0.0067 0.0154** 
 
0.0074** 
 
-0.0039*** 
 
-0.0063*** 
 
1 191,291*** 
 
0.1762*** 
 
0.8171*** 
 
-0.0085*** 
 
-0.0053*** 
 
0.0206** 
 
-0.0041*** 
 
2 57,600*** 
 
0.1684*** 
 
0.3165*** 
 
0.0185*** 
 
0.0109** 
 
0.0104*** 
 
-0.0034*** 
 
3 32,717*** 
 
0.1558*** 
 
0.2374*** 
 
0.0242*** 
 
0.0097*** 
 
0.0110*** 
 
-0.0050*** 
 
4 20,283*** 
 
0.1262*** 
 
0.2178*** 
 
0.0311*** 
 
0.0098*** 
 
0.0206*** 
 
-0.0028*** 
 
[1,20] 25,554*** 
 
0.0554 0.1461*** 
 
0.0147*** 
 
0.0035*** 
 
0.0154 0.0058*** 
 
[1,40] 15,370*** 
 
0.0081 0.0864*** 
 
0.0154*** 
 
0.0033*** 
 
0.0205 0.0096 
[1, 80] 8,143*** 
 
-0.0274** 
 
0.0481*** 
 
0.0188* 
 
0.0025*** 
 
0.0192 0.0103 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation examines the impact of discretionary trading halts on the trading behaviour 
of stocks listed on the ASX. Despite the plethora of research that have examined the impact 
of trading halts on overseas securities exchanges, the examination as to its effectiveness in 
the Australian equities market has been limited. This dissertation was primarily motivated to 
address this gap in the literature, especially given the significant disparity in the relative 
number of trading halts to the number of listed shares in Australia compared to the United 
States. An event study methodology is used to investigate for any abnormal changes in 
liquidity, volatility and returns of ASX stocks around a trading halt. Abnormal trading 
behaviour is assessed by comparing halted stock trading behaviour to a control sample of 
pseudo-halts.  
 
The results show that both trading volume and volatility are abnormally higher immediately 
after a trading halt and persist afterwards for up to one trading day. This should be of concern 
to market participants, as trading halts are designed to protect investors around periods of 
high uncertainty, by means of curbing excess volatility. These results are consistent with 
those found in the United States by Corwin and Lipson (2000) and in Australia by Aitken, 
Frino and Winn (1995).  
 
Relative bid-ask spreads are found to be immediately wider for halted stocks compared to 
control stocks. The spreads remain abnormally wide for up to 3 hours after a trading halt and 
then narrow for the remaining portion of the post-halt period. These results are slightly 
different to those of Aitken, Frino and Winn (1995), who find that abnormal spreads persist 
for up to two trading days following trading halts on the ASX. This suggests that the trading 
halt mechanism used by the ASX has improved, allowing for a better information 
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dissemination process to find the true equilibrium price for the halted stock upon trade 
resumption.  
 
Order depth near the best quotes is found to be abnormally low immediately after trading 
halts, but total order depth is found to be abnormally high. This is partially explained by stale 
orders that remain on the trading system. The result is similar to the finding of Corwin and 
Lipson (2000), except for their finding of abnormally high order depth at the best quotes 
before and after a trading halt. This disparity is explained by the presence of a specialist on 
the NYSE, who may set their quotes wider leading up to a trading halt, because they fear 
holding an unwanted inventory position during the trading halt.  
 
An examination of abnormal returns for halted stocks reveals that a significant amount of 
‘price discovery’ occurs around a trading halt. This suggests the presence of anticipatory 
trading behaviour in the lead up to a trading halt. Abnormal returns are found to be 
significant during the halt and also for up to a trading day following the halt. This confirms 
that trading halts do not allow for a complete dissemination of information during the trading 
halt and is consistent with the findings of wider relative bid-ask spreads in the post-halt 
period. Nonetheless, it can be said that the trading halt mechanism does the job of finding a 
reasonable Figure for the true equilibrium post-halt stock price, where no price reversal is 
detected after the trading halt.  
 
The type of news announcement during a trading halt does not significantly alter the impact 
of trading halts. Rather, the results reveal that the impact of trading halts is a function of 
various exogenous variables including firm size and trading halt duration. Trading halts on 
larger stocks lead to narrower spreads, lower volatility and lower abnormal returns in the 
post-halt trading period. This can be explained by lower uncertainty and asymmetric 
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information in larger stocks that are widely followed by analysts. This suggests that market 
regulators should consider the size of the firm when making the decision of whether to 
implement a trading halt. Trading halt duration is also found to alter the effectiveness of 
trading halts in reducing volatility and liquidity. Trading halts of longer durations result in 
higher volatility and wider bid-ask spreads immediately following a trading halt. 
 
Overall, the results of this study show that trading halts are associated with lower levels of 
liquidity, higher levels of volatility and significant abnormal returns following a trading halt. 
These findings indicate that trading halts do not improve market quality compared to the 
alternative of continuous trading (as measured by pseudo-halts). It appears that, market 
quality following a trading halt is affected by factors other than the magnitude of the price 
move. A potential candidate for explaining the remaining portion is the ‘learn-by-trading' 
class of models, which suggest that the act of calling a trading halt is detrimental to market 
quality. It should be recognised that care must be taken in applying the results of this study 
due to the pseudo-halt methodology used, which excludes trading halts with extreme price 
moves. Therefore, the resulting selection bias, narrows the scope of the conclusions to trading 
halts with relatively small halt returns. It is also possible that some other fundamental, but 
unidentified, differences exist between events that lead to a trading halt and those that do not.  
 
The results from this dissertation provide several potential future research directions. To 
further investigate liquidity around trading halts on the ASX, it would be necessary to 
examine the amount of order submissions and cancellations. This would provide a more 
complete understanding as to whether increases in total order depth after a trading halt are 
associated with stale orders. Another possible research area would involve examining the 
trading behaviour of different types of investors around trading halts. Trading halts are 
designed to protect small investors by allowing time for information to be disseminated. 
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Bildik (2004) is the only study to investigate whether institutional investors take advantage 
over retail investors during a trading halt. More work is needed in this area to determine if 
these results hold on other equities markets. Overall, this study provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of the impact of trading halts on market quality, which can 
allow ASX exchange officials and securities market regulators to appropriately assess 
whether changes to the current trading halt procedure are needed.  
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APPENDIX: COMPANY ANNOUNCMENT REPORT CODES 
For a company to list, and stay listed, on the Australian Stock Exchange, various rules and regulations need to 
be followed.  As part of these listing requirements, various documentation (or company announcements) needs 
to be presented to the ASX Companies Department. 
 
As a means of enabling Subscribers to categorise the Company Announcements, each Company 
Announcement Alert Header (RB message type) has a field called "Report Code".  Outlined below are details 
of the Primary Report Codes and Sub Codes for more specific identification of the report type. 
 
    PRIMARY            SUB  PRIMARY/SUB CODE  
REPORT CODE REPORT CODE         DESCRIPTION 
 
01 000 TAKEOVER  ANNOUNCEMENT 
 001 Intention to Make Takeover offer 
 002 Part A statement 
 003 Part B statement 
 004  Part C statement 
 005 Part D statement 
 006 Takeover Offer Document 
 007 Takeover Offeree Directors' Statement 
 008 Variation of Takeover Offer 
 009 Takeover - Other 
 010 - 011 Reserved For Future Use 
 
02 000 SHAREHOLDER DETAILS 
 001 Form 603 - Becoming a substantial shareholder 
 002 Form 604 - Change in substantial shareholding 
 003 Form 605 - Ceasing to be a substantial shareholder 
 004 Part 6.8 Beneficial ownership 
 005 Section 689 - Notice 
 006 Shareholder Details - Other 
 007 Section 235 Notice - Director's Interests 
 008 - 012 Reserved For Future Use 
 
03 000 PERIODIC REPORTS 
 001 Annual Report 
 002 Top 20 Shareholders 
 003 Preliminary - Final Statement 
 004 Half - Yearly Report 
 005 Annual Report - confirmation of despatch 
 006 Trust 6 month accounts 
 007 Trust 12 month accounts 
 008 Loan securities on issue 
 009 Half Yearly Audit Review 
 010 Half Yearly Directors' Statement 
 011 ASC Annual Audited A/Cs 
 012  ASC Annual Audit Review  
 013 ASC Annual Directors' Statement 
 014 Periodic Reports - Other 
 015 ASC Half-Yearly Audited Accounts 
 016 Net Tangible Asset Backing 
 017 - 021 Reserved For Future Use 
 
 
    PRIMARY            SUB  PRIMARY/SUB CODE  
REPORT CODE REPORT CODE         DESCRIPTION 
 
04 000 QUARTERLY ACTIVITIES REPORT 
 001 First Quarter Activities Report 
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002  Second Quarter Activities Report 
 003 Third Quarter Activities Report 
 004 Fourth Quarter Activities Report 
 005 Quarterly Activities Report - Other 
 006 - 010 Reserved For Future Use 
 
05 000 QUARTERLY CASH FLOW REPORT 
 001 First Quarter Cashflow Report 
 002 Second Quarter Cashflow Report 
 003 Third Quarter Cashflow Report 
 004 Fourth Quarter Cashflow Report 
 005 Quarterly Cashflow Report - Other 
 006 - 010 Reserved For Future Use 
  
06 000 ISSUED CAPITAL 
 001 Renounceable Issue 
 002 Bonus Issue 
 003 Placement 
 004 Issues to the Public 
 005 Capital Reconstruction 
 006 New Issue Letter of Offer & Acc. Form 
 007 Alteration to issued capital 
 008 Non-Renounceable Issue 
 009 Issued Capital - Other 
 010 Prospectus 
 011 On-Market Buy-Back Scheme 
 012 - 016 Reserved For Future Use 
 
07 000 ASSET ACQUISITION & DISPOSAL 
 001 Asset Acquisition 
 002 Asset Disposal 
 003 Other 
 004 - 009 Reserved For Future Use 
 
08 000 NOTICE OF MEETING 
 001 Notice of Annual Meeting 
 002  Notice of Extraordinary Meeting 
 003 Results of Meeting 
 004 Proxy Form 
 005 Alteration to Notice of Meeting 
 006 Notice of Meeting - Other 
 007 - 008 Reserved For Future Use 
 
    PRIMARY            SUB  PRIMARY/SUB CODE  
REPORT CODE REPORT CODE         DESCRIPTION 
 
09 000 STOCK EXCHANGE ANNOUNCEMENT 
 001 Suspension from Official Quotation 
 002 Reinstatement to Official Quotation 
 003 Removal from Official List 
 004 Stock Exchange Query 
 005 Notice Pending 
 006 Change in Basis of Quotation 
 007 Trading Halt 
 008 Admission to Official List 
 009 Commencement of Official Quotation 
 010  Stock Exchange Announcement - Other 
 011 - 015 Reserved For Future Use 
 
10 000 DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENT 
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001 Dividend Books Closing 
 002 Dividend Pay Date 
 003 Dividend Rate 
 004 Dividend Alteration 
 005 Dividend - Other 
 006 - 010 Reserved For Future Use 
  
11 000 PROGRESS REPORT 
 001 Progress Report 
 002 Progress Report - Other 
 003 - 007 Reserved For Future Use 
 
12 000 COMPANY ADMINISTRATION  
 001 Director Appointment/Resignation 
 002 Details of Company Address 
 003 Details of Registered office address 
 004 Details of Share Registry address 
 005 Trustee Appointment/Resignation  
 006 Trust Manager Appointment/Resignation 
 007 Company Secretary 
  Appointment/Resignation 
 008 Company Administration - Other 
 009 Change of Balance Date 
 010 Trust Deed 
 011 Articles of Association 
 012 - 017 Reserved For Future Use 
 
13 000 NOTICE OF CALL (Contributing Shares) 
 001 Announcement of Call 
 002 Notice of Call to shareholders  
 003 Notice of Call - Other 
 004 - 008 Reserved For Future Use 
 
14 000 OTHER 
 001 Other 
 002 - 006 Reserved For Future Use 
 100 CAP Test 
 
    PRIMARY            SUB  PRIMARY/SUB CODE  
REPORT CODE REPORT CODE         DESCRIPTION 
 
15 000 CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS  
 001 Chairman's Address - Other 
 002 Chairman's Address 
 003 - 008 Reserved For Future Use 
  
16 000 LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS  
 001 Letter to Shareholders - Other 
 002 Letter to Shareholders 
 003 - 008 Reserved For Future Use 
  
17 000 ASX QUERY 
 001 ASX Query - Other 
 002 ASX Query 
 003 Response to ASX Query 
 004 - 009 Reserved For Future Use 
  
 18   000   WARRANTS 
    001   Other 
    002   Warrant Report 
    003 - 008  Reserved for Future Use 
 
 19   000   RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
    001 - 005  Reserved For Future Use 
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The nineteen categories are reduced to seven categories based on similar 
characteristics. The eight groupings are: 
 
1. Asset acquisition/ Disposal: Includes announcement types associated with asset 
acquisitions and asset disposals 
2. ASX announcement/query: Includes both ASX announcements and ASX queries 
relating to the listed company subject to a trading halt. 
3. Financial Information: Includes all announcement types associated with financial 
information. This includes dividends announcements, periodic reports, quarterly 
activity reports and quarterly cash flow reports. 
4. Miscellaneous: Includes all announcement types that are not expected to have a 
significant impact on prices. These include announcements about shareholder details, 
company meetings, company administrative notices, call notices (Contributing 
Shares), chairman's address, letters to shareholders, warrants and others.  
5. Progress Report: Includes only Progress Reports by the listed company. 
6. Share issue: Includes any announcement types related to the issue of capital by the 
listed company. 
7. Takeover related: Includes announcement types related to all forms of takeover 
announcements. 
 
 
 
